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2019 ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus: Enhancing Bilateral and Regional Cooperative Security for India and Japan in the Indo-Pacific

Dr. Monika Chansoria

Since the end of the Cold War, cooperative security became a catchphrase term used generally to describe a more peaceful approach to security through increased international cooperation. The cooperative security model essentially embraced four concentric and mutually reinforcing “rings of security”: *Individual Security, Collective Security, Collective Defense, and Promoting Stability*.¹ In 1992, American strategists — Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner discussed cooperative security in terms of providing new avenues toward world peace, and argued, “Organizing principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of the cold war... Cooperative Security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post-cold war era.”² Two years later, in 1994, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described cooperative security as tending “... to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism.”³

In the contemporary and evolving understanding of cooperative security, promotion of stability outside the boundaries of states is regarded as an integral component that constitutes the cooperative

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1 Richard Cohen, “Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability” in Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order*, The Marshall Center Papers, no. 3, The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2001.

2 Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press) 1993.

3 Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 96, Fall 1994.

security system. Cooperative Security can be described as a “strategic system,” as it does not easily fit the generic accepted definition of a “strategy” which has been described as “the integrated application of means to achieve desired ends.”⁴ The word “system” implies that the concept cannot be fully realized in abstract, and should be based on existing or newly-created, and resilient institutions.⁵ The starting point for cooperative security would be creation of a strong normative base.⁶ In the contemporary context, new age collective security can be inferred as an understanding/commitment among groups of nations with commonality of interests and values to protect the security interests of individual members within their joint spheres of interest. This, to a large extent, applies to liberal democracies wherein respect for the rule of international law remains integral.⁷

Cooperative security, as a system appears proactive, whilst being prepared to engage in collective diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military action in areas outside common space which may threaten the states’ own security and stability. Commenting on ‘status quo’ as a concept, Hans Morgenthau had opined, “... policy of status quo aims at the maintenance of distribution of power as it exists at a particular moment in history.”⁸ As few nations become more revisionist, expansionist, and combative, the essential tenets of new age

cooperative security, i.e., to reduce the risk of war [or conflict] which are not directed towards a specific country or coalition of countries⁹ shall be sought after. In order to develop the spirit of a common future, and promotion of stability, the system of cooperative security should seek for democratic countries to cooperate mutually for regional peace and security. The future success of cooperative security will hinge inherently upon common systems, institutions, and values, which foster a sense of security based on global rules and commons.

More than five decades ago, in 1967, the Australian National University held a conference based on the theme, *India, Japan, Australia: Partners in Asia?* The conference delegates thought ‘...the future would be determined by how China behaved, and how others behaved towards China...’ Moreover, concerns revolved around Washington’s actions in the region and securing lasting economic growth.¹⁰ Fifty years on, the notion of enhanced cooperation between Australia, India and Japan is right back, driven implicitly by the challenges that Beijing poses.¹¹

Sixth ADMM-Plus Meeting, Bangkok, November 2019

The Indo-Pacific region is undergoing a dramatic period of flux and transformation bringing in its own set of opportunities and challenges, which require flexible and swift

4 Cohen, n. 1.

5 Ibid.

6 Michael Moodie, “Cooperative Security: Implications for National Security and International Relations,” Occasional Paper/14, Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, January 2000.

7 Stefan Aleksovski, et al., “Collective Security – The Role of International Organizations: Implications in International Security Order,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, vol. 5, no. 27, December 2014.

8 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978) p. 46.

9 Aleksovski, et al., n. 7.

10 Ian Hall, “The Australia–India–Japan trilateral: converging interests... and converging perceptions?” *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 17, 2017.

11 For more details, see Hall, Ibid.

mechanisms for cooperation to manage the changes occurring in the region.¹² All of this is to say that there are numerous challenges at a time of great transition in states' economic activity, strategic weight and international ambitions. Crises and transnational issues don't respect the boundaries of traditional groupings or stay neatly in a single region.¹³ Therefore, over a period of time, smaller group diplomacy/'minilateralism' will matter more in the Indo-Pacific because every strategic issue that the region is confronted with, is different, and is likely to engage different countries in different combinations.¹⁴

In this backdrop, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers and their counterparts from Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States (making it a total of 18) gathered at the 6th ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus in Bangkok on November 18, 2019. The ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) is the only official framework of Defense Ministers in the Asia-Pacific Region. The meeting underscored advancing partnership for sustainable security as well as a commitment to ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific by strengthening defense and security cooperation. Reaffirming their commitment towards regional peace, security, and stability by respecting universally recognized principles of international law, the Ministers pledged to promote cooperation and interactions, reach out to potential partners as well as respond collectively and constructively to global developments and security issues based on amicable and mutually beneficial relations.

The Ministers highlighted the significance of the ADMM-Plus as a key component of a robust, effective, and open regional security arrangement that contributes to trust and confidence-building as well as practical defense and security cooperation between ASEAN Member States and Plus Countries in response to common security threats in the region, whilst upholding ASEAN centrality and unity.¹⁵ The Ministers recognized the progress of practical cooperation under ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups (EWGs), namely Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Maritime Security, Military Medicine, Counterterrorism, Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian Mine Action and Cyber Security.

The overall dialogue and exercises within the framework of ADMM-Plus EWGs have contributed substantially to capacity-building and interoperability enhancement amongst ADMM-Plus countries, in order to address security challenges for the collective benefit of the region. The new Co-Chairs of the ADMM-Plus EWGs for the 2020-2023 cycles have been chosen, beginning with the ASEAN Defense Senior Officials' Meeting Plus in 2020 in Vietnam. The ADMM initiatives have been put in place for ensuring practical cooperation amongst ASEAN Member States to collectively prevent miscalculation and respond to regional security threats.¹⁶ The ADMM-Plus framework places special emphasis on adherence to international law, encouraging safe and professional military interaction, preventing armed conflict, and providing mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes in treaties and conventions.¹⁷

12 Transcript, "Indo-Pacific Security Paradigm- Australia's Choices," Australian High Commissioner to India's Address, National Defence College, New Delhi, May 8, 2017.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Joint Statement by the ADMM-Plus Defense Ministers on *Advancing Partnership for Sustainable Security*, ASEAN Secretariat, November 22, 2019.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

The ADMM-Plus framework also recognizes that security threats and challenges in the Asia-Pacific are trans-boundary and are increasing in frequency and severity – thereby calling for increased regional integration and connectivity as well as technological advancement to counter non-traditional security threats. This calls for countries in the region to forge practical cooperation and find sustainable ways to prevent and address these common security threats.¹⁸ In this regard, the ADMM-Plus framework remains committed to ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening defense and security cooperation. This includes resolving disputes peacefully in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and maintaining and respecting freedom of navigation and overflight as well as advancing partnership in order to effectively respond to regional security threats in a sustainable manner, particularly through the ADMM-Plus EWGs and ASEAN-led security mechanisms based on mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual benefits.¹⁹

During the meetings, India's Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh also held bilateral meetings with Defense Minister of Japan Taro Kono and others counterparts at the sidelines. In their deliberations, Singh and Kono reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral defense relations and discussed ways to further improve ties. Singh's meeting with Kono was his first with the latter. Both leaders held detailed discussions on adding further momentum to India-Japan defense cooperation and expressed satisfaction over the defense engagements and exercises between their respective Armed Forces.²⁰ Taro Kono, former foreign minister, took over as Japan's defense minister following the

September 2019 Cabinet reshuffle. Although he has not been the vice minister of defense, Kono has served as an active member of the Liberal Democratic Party's National Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee since long. Well known for his proficiency in the English language, Kono's role is crucial as the defense minister in handling relationships as Japan seeks to bolster and expand ties with major allies and partners including the US, Australia, India, France and others.

Indo-Japan Defense Engagement: An Overview

India's posture and approach that remains critical to its strategic objectives highlights the growing convergence of political, economic and security interests with stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. Co-opting Japan as a permanent member of the Malabar Trilateral Initiative and India's accreditation of its Ambassador to a separate and dedicated diplomatic mission at the ASEAN are manifestations of Delhi's intent. Moreover, India and Japan remain committed to strengthen the East Asia Summit (EAS) and make it a more dynamic proactive process and platform to discuss regional political, economic and security issues. New Delhi and Tokyo also are working towards convening the EAS Ambassadors' meeting in Jakarta and establishment of the EAS Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat. Maritime cooperation and regional connectivity within the EAS framework need to be enhanced further. This only highlights the significance and vitality of regional architecture through ASEAN-led fora such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum and their coordination to tackle global and regional challenges

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Raksha Mantri holds various bilateral meetings on the sidelines of ADMM-Plus in Bangkok, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defense, November 17, 2019.

including maritime security.²¹

The momentum at which the Indo-Pacific has assumed focus in New Delhi's strategic thinking is unmistakable, both characteristically and substantively. India's growing regional standing has influenced its integration with key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. Re-orientation of India's strategic focus from a "Look East" to an "Act East" policy, finds manifestation in the ensuing approach, by and large, towards the Indo-Pacific. And Japan, surely, remains among the key frontal pivots of this focus. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian PM Narendra Modi have long been in agreement to secure stability in the Indo-Pacific region, which remains indispensable to Tokyo and New Delhi's national security.

Corresponding with the "Act East" policy approach and course, the regular dispatch of warships, including frontline destroyers and stealth frigates on long overseas deployment to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea verify India's renewed maritime intent.²² The noticeable presence of the Indian flag on these strategically vital points, reiterates that New Delhi is fully cognizant of the ongoing movements in its strategic backyard, being a major stakeholder. Given its 7,500 km coastline, 1200 islands and 2.4 million sq km exclusive economic zone (EEZ), India's reorientation and demonstration of being a consistent security partner for the region highlights its maritime interests and stakes in the larger Indo-Pacific. Notably, India's first Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command in the southeast corner of the Bay lies just 90 miles (145 km) from Indonesia's Aceh Province, bordering the strategically vital Strait of Malacca.

It would only be apposite to cite the Indian Defense Ministry's 2011-2012 Annual Report that stated, "As rising nations ... become more powerful, emerging risks require greater attention ... India remains conscious and watchful of the implications of China's military profile in the immediate and extended neighborhood."²³ Besides, in a public interaction during his 2014 Tokyo official visit, Prime Minister Modi commented on the presence of 18th century 'expansionist mindset' among certain regional actors – that of encroaching upon other countries, intruding in others' waters, and capturing territory. This was widely interpreted as an oblique reference to China's recent and recurring actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

The September 2014 Tokyo Declaration acknowledged converging global interests and critical maritime inter-connections between India and Japan by means of its *Special Strategic and Global Partnership*. It was in this declaration that both sides attached special importance to the regularization of bilateral maritime exercises as well as Japan's continued participation in the India-US Malabar series of naval exercises. While addressing the Indian Parliament in August 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had averred, "... a strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India." The role of India and Japan for stability, prosperity and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region by means of the "Act East Policy," and "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" shall further be consolidated through bilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation mechanisms. The entry into force of the two Defense Framework Agreements concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and concerning Security Measures

21 *Japan-India Joint Statement*, November 11, 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo; also see, *Annual Report 2015-16* Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

22 *Annual Report 2016-17*, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

23 Indian Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report 2011-2012*, Government of India, 2012, available at <http://india.gov.in/outerwin.php?id=http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html> pp. 6-9.

for the Protection of Classified Military Information was considered a welcome move. Japan’s readiness to provide its state-of-the-art defense platforms shall become an important bilateral security benchmark.

Bilateral defense engagement needs to be expanded through greater two-way collaboration and technology cooperation, co-development and co-production, and expediting discussions for determining specific items through the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation.²⁴ Former Japanese Vice-Minister of Defense, Masanori Nishi pointed out that Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) deployment has significant reliance on Indian logistical support that would provide more opportunities for Japanese vessels to visit Indian ports during voyages across the Indian Ocean. Nishi opined that Japan could play an active role in stabilizing the Indian Ocean and reinforcing a rules-based order in the following areas:

- 1) Engagement with key Bay of Bengal states such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka through investments in infrastructure and capability-building
- 2) Support for emerging regional institutions in the Indian Ocean such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
- 3) Maritime capacity-building among Indian Ocean island states and other developing states in the Indian Ocean, with a focus on blue economy; and
- 4) Enhanced role for the Japanese Coast Guard.²⁵

This emergent *realpolitik* reflected yet again

in the November 2016 joint statement between Prime Ministers Abe and Modi that highlighted safeguarding global commons in the maritime, space and cyber domains. Tokyo and New Delhi remain committed to respecting freedom of navigation and over flight, and unimpeded lawful commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which establishes the international legal order of the seas and oceans. In this context, all parties need to resolve disputes through peaceful means, without resorting to threat, or use of force, and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities, while avoiding unilateral actions that cause escalation of tensions.

Japan and India are in agreement regarding the effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and an early conclusion of the negotiations to establish a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law. Featuring prominently in the Japan-India Joint Statement consistently is underscoring the UNCLOS, freedom of navigation and over flight and unimpeded lawful commerce in international waters. The strategic upheaval in the South China Sea caused by unilateral actions such as massive land reclamation of submerged reefs, and militarization of this converted land has notched up regional tensions. It also raises criticality of the sea lanes of communication that underpin vitality of seeking to ensure continuing stability in the Indo-Pacific.²⁶

During the September 2017 India-Japan Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue exchanges

24 *Japan-India Joint Statement*, November 11, 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo; also see, *Annual Report 2015-16* Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

25 Masanori Nishi, “The role of Japan in Indian Ocean security: A Japanese perspective,” in David Brewster, ed., *Indo-Pacific Maritime Security: Challenges and Cooperation*, National Security College Crawford School of Public Policy ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, The Australian National University, July 2016.

26 Moodie, n. 6.

between Japan Ground Self Defense Force and the Indian Army were agreed upon, especially to develop counterterrorism as a key area of common interest. In the context of enhanced co-operation between the two ground forces, it was decided to explore a joint field exercise in the field of counterterrorism between the Indian Army and the JGSDF in 2018. In the maritime realm, the success of Japan-India-US Trilateral Maritime Exercise Malabar 2017 held in July was welcomed and Japan expressed its intention to have state-of-the-art Japanese assets including P-1 to participate in the Malabar 2018. The two sides also considered inclusion of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) training to expand cooperation and pursue exchanges and training by ASW aviation units such as P-3C. Japan proposed inviting the Indian Navy to mine-countermeasures training held by the JMSDF.²⁷ The two countries agreed to encourage equipment collaboration including defense and dual-use technologies and identified specific areas of collaboration in the field of defense equipment and technology cooperation, including commencing technical discussions for research collaboration in the areas of unmanned ground vehicles and robotics.²⁸

With the “Indo-Pacific Region” featuring prominently in the very title of the 2025 joint vision statement between India and Japan, the writing on the wall is apparent. A vital demonstration of India’s growing maritime focus extending beyond the Indian Ocean comes with Japan’s participation in the trilateral maritime exercise [Malabar] between India, US and Japan. The bilateral Indo-US Malabar naval maneuvers got a boost in 2014, after being upgraded to a trilateral initiative, this time including the Japanese navy. Since 2014, Exercise Malabar

has involved the navies of India, and the United States, along with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The trilateral exercises have witnessed greater inter-operability and integration between the three navies. Common political values, principles, democratic systems and convergence on regional and world views, carries a political message that seeks to convey India, US and Japan’s orientation towards securing the future of maritime Indo-Pacific.

Fulfilling Cooperative Security in Tangible Terms

Given the concept of a broader Asia that is fast transcending geographical boundaries and lines, the emerging proximities render the prospects for cooperative regional security mechanisms, more deliverable than ever before. The notion of the greater Indo-Pacific has eclipsed the spheres of influence limited to the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacific. In this reference, numerous policy statements coming from Japan have indicated that security issues in the Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, and East China Sea cannot be treated separately, or, as stand-alone issues alone. At its heart, a strategic system can be understood as a set of geopolitical power relationships among nations where major changes in one part of the system affect what happens in the other parts.²⁹ The contemporary Indo-Pacific means recognizing the accelerating economic and security connections between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean region in creating a single strategic system. Regional players will be pushed to make prudent choices, whilst pursuing a sovereign foreign policy path that best suits their respective national security interests. Indubitably, greater onus shall lie

27 For more details see, *Joint Press Statement on India-Japan Annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue*, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, September 6, 2017, available at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=170560>

28 Ibid.

29 Rory Medcalf, “The evolving security order in the Indo-Pacific Professor,” in Brewster, ed., n. 25; also see, Rory Medcalf, “The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?” *The American Interest*, vol. 9, no. 2, Nov/Dec 2013, pp. 58-66.

on regional liberal democracies that have perennially demonstrated respect for the rule of international law, norms, and agreements and showcase their strategic sagacity in the emerging scenario developing in the Indo-Pacific.

India's active engagement in the region within the ambit of its "Act East" policy initiative compliments Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy." Both these policy initiatives seek to nurture an open and transparent Indo-Pacific maritime zone as part of a broader Asia. This concept of a broader Asia is fast transcending geographical boundaries, with the Pacific and Indian Oceans' merger becoming far more pronounced and evident. These emerging proximities render the prospects for cooperative regional security mechanisms, more deliverable than ever before. India and Japan depict strong and shared essential freedoms and democratic values. Given the post-war identity as a state unconstrained by great-power relationships, India's broader approach resonates and dovetails neatly with the omnidirectional pragmatism³⁰ of the combined leadership of Abe and Modi.

Symbolizing acknowledgment of the economic and strategic dependence on developments across a much wider maritime region, the Indo-Pacific prioritizes allocation of resources, security partners, membership and agendas of regional diplomatic and security institutions.³¹ This also suggests that the region will remain central in underscoring that

the history, geo-economics, geopolitics and strategic cultures amongst its major players shall continue to represent a fundamental clash of interests, thereby creating major barriers in their co-existence.³²

The Indian Ocean also doubles up as a geopolitical and geo-economic nerve center that remains critical to the regional construct, and its primacy. To a large extent, the Indian Ocean has significantly replaced the Atlantic as the world's busiest and strategically most significant trade corridor.³³ Consequently, major East Asian economies have acute dependence on oil imports across the Indian Ocean from the Middle East and Africa. The region is often labeled as the artery that carries resources to fuel the growth of regional economies. However, on the flip side, dependence of this nature can become a strategic vulnerability that could well influence regional partnership-building and diplomatic relations.

Investments in ports across various locations in the Indo-Pacific stretching from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean Region have critical strategic ramifications that shall likely shuffle security alignments regionally. All these coupled with pure military strategies such as anti-access/area-denial capabilities, long-range precision strikes, and surface and undersea operations, shall likely render tensions across the Indo-Pacific. The management of leveraging growing economic and military power to assert sovereignty claims with repeated attempts at changing or altering the existing status quo,

30 John Nilsson-Wright, "Creative Minilateralism in a Changing Asia: Opportunities for Security Convergence and Cooperation between Australia, India and Japan," Asia Programme, Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) July 2017.

31 Rory Medcalf, "Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific," The Asan Forum, June 26, 2015, available at <http://www.theasanforum.org/reimagining-asia-from-asia-pacific-toindo-pacific/>

32 For a detailed debate on India-China relations, see Mohan J. Malik, *China and India: Great Power Rivals*, (First Forum Press, Boulder, 2011) p. 9.

33 Justin Jones, "Submarines and Maritime Strategy – Part 1," *The Strategist*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, January 29, 2013; and see Commonwealth of Australia, *Defense White Paper 2013*, p. 13, available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013>

below the threshold of actual conflict, and a bid to create a *new/fresh status quo situation*, be it over features in the East China Sea, South China Sea, or over the Himalayan borderlands is a trend that holds dangerous portends. This geo-strategic graph of existential realities across the Indo-Pacific calls for enhanced security cooperation between India and Japan. Ensuring that dialogue participation will remain the lynchpin for mapping out a shared vision for a futuristic Indo-Pacific strategy, the two nations trilateral need to work together to build the politico-economic capacity of regional states in order to render them capable of retaining and exercising their autonomy, defend their interests and identify common regional security challenges that straddle a geographic space extending from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, and incorporate risks in South, Southeast and Northeast Asia.

Cooperative security shall only be realized in tangible terms when nations develop a sense of a common future, based upon shared political systems, forms of representation and governance, institutions and values that foster a sense of a security based on global commons and rules. Regular military and political dialogues, confidence-building and deterrence-enhancing regional exercises are the foundation in offsetting traditional security threats and challenges. Maritime security and stability in the Indo-Pacific will become more effective with converging themes in the realms of maritime security and cooperation. These will be the benchmark in identifying potential and common challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Besides, it is vital to analyze gaps in the corresponding domestic and regional policy frameworks. Growing symmetry in defense cooperation will help creating stronger capabilities to deal with common maritime threats and challenges in the Indo-Pacific region through enhanced disaster response and mitigation capacities. And finally, exploring and emphasizing the potential arenas of maritime stability and security between India and Japan amid their respective triangular

equations, i.e., India–Japan–US, and Japan–Australia–India will be the major regional equations that shall determine the balance of power and future roadmap of Indo-Pacific’s security and stability.