

**Symposium on Postwar Japan's 70 Years
and Proactive Contribution to Peace**
—Striving for the Rule of Law in the Asia-Pacific Region—

March 2015

 **NTT Advertising**


 公益財団法人日本国際問題研究所
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Part I



Part II





Part III



Special Speech



Preface

The year 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and, on the occasion of this important milestone year, NTT Advertising and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), supported by Nikkei Inc., held an international symposium on February 27 titled “Postwar Japan’s 70 Years and Proactive Contribution to Peace – Striving for the Rule of Law in the Asia-Pacific Region” in order to encourage a broad-ranging discussion on Japan’s contributions to international society thus far, and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Seventy years have passed since World War II, and there has been an extremely major transformation in today’s international situation compared to the immediate post-war years. Looking across the Asia-Pacific region, major changes are occurring in the economic and military balance and, against that backdrop, there are obvious moves aimed at changing the status quo by force. In order to ensure Japan’s security and prosperity in the midst of that, establishing a stable international order that is based on the “rule of law” in the Asia-Pacific region is a highly important challenge.

This Symposium was accomplished through the participation of frontline researchers and specialists from the United States, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia as well as France and the United Kingdom, from the standpoint of eliciting a diverse discussion on the direction to be followed by Japan and the role it should fulfill, based on the expectations and wishes of neighboring countries as well as major countries elsewhere regarding how Japan responds and the format it adopts for advancing the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” policy unveiled by the Abe Administration, amid the fluid international situation that still exists 70 years on from the war.

As is recorded in this report, a highly animated discussion took place at the Symposium in front of an audience of close to 400 people. Along with aiming to actively set the international agenda in order to achieve a global order desirable to Japan, JIIA hopes that undertaking awareness programs that domestically will also serve to strengthen the diplomatic capacity for creating a stable international environment based on rules, that prevent the emergence of threats promote domestic understanding of the challenges facing Japan, and assist in the transmission of information overseas as outlined in the National Security Strategy formulated by the Government of Japan.

March 2015

Yoshiji NOGAMI
President
The Japan Institute of International Affairs

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Program

Symposium on Postwar Japan's 70 Years and Proactive Contribution to Peace —Striving for the Rule of Law in the Asia-Pacific Region—

Organized by JIIA
Supported by Nikkei Inc. / Sponsored by NTT Advertising, Inc.

February 27, 2015
Venue: Ascot Hall, B2F South Wing, Hotel Okura Tokyo

Part I : *“Challenges Facing the Liberal International Order and Japan's Role”*

- (09:30-** Registration)
- 10:00-10:10am** Welcoming Remarks: **Yoshiji Nogami** (President, JIIA)
Opening Remarks: **Eriko Yamatani** (Minister in charge of Ocean Policy and Territorial Integrity)
- 10:10-10:30am** Keynote Speech: **Richard Haass** (President, Council on Foreign Relations)
- 10:30-12:00pm** Panel Discussion 1:
Moderator: **Yoshiji Nogami** (President, JIIA)
Panelists: **Shinichi Kitaoka** (President, International University of Japan)
Valérie Niquet (Senior Research Fellow, Head of Asia Department, Foundation for Strategic Research (FSR))
Edward Schwarck (Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI))
Rizal Sukma (Executive Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS))
- 12:00-1:30pm** Break (1h30min)

Part II : *“Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific and Expectations of Japan”*

- 1:30-1:50pm** Keynote Speech: **Patrick Cronin** (Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security (CNAS))
- 1:50-3:20pm** Panel Discussion 2:
Moderator: **Yoshiji Nogami** (President, JIIA)
Panelists: **Choi Wooseon** (Associate Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
William Choong (Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow, IISS)
Michael Fullilove (Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy)
Hoang Anh Tuan (Director General, Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam)
Matake Kamiya (Professor, National Defense Academy)
- 3:20-3:40pm** Break (20min)

Part III: “Maritime Security and Management of Ocean Environment in East Asia”

3:40-4:00pm	Keynote Speech: Rodman Bundy (Director, Dispute Resolution Group, Eversheds LLP)
4:00-5:30pm	Panel Discussion 3: Moderator: Kazuhiro Nakatani (Professor, University of Tokyo) Panelists: Henry Bensurto Jr. (Consul General, San Francisco, PCG / Former Secretary-General of the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs Secretariat (CMOAS)) Zack Cooper (Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Japan Chair) Tetsuo Kotani (Senior Fellow, JIIA) Nguyen Lan Anh (Deputy Director-General, Institute for South China Sea Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam) Elina Noor (Assistant Director, Foreign Policy and Security Studies, ISIS Malaysia)
5:30-5:55pm	Special Speech: “Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific and Challenges Facing the US-Japan Alliance” Kurt Campbell (CEO, The Asia Group / Former United States Assistant Secretary of State)
5:55-6:00pm	Closing Remarks: Yoshiji Nogami (President, JIIA)

Profile of Moderators and Panelists

Richard Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations)



Dr. Richard Haass is in his twelfth year as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource to help people better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. From January 2001 to June 2003, Dr. Haass was director of policy planning for the Department of State, where he was a principal adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Dr. Haass also was vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Haass is the author or editor of twelve books on American foreign policy. His most recent books are *Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order*, and *War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars*.

Shinichi Kitaoka (President, International University of Japan)



Professor Shinichi Kitaoka is a leading scholar in modern Japanese political and diplomatic history. He is professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, and Senior Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). Dr. Kitaoka has served as Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations (2004-2006), and chaired the Japanese scholars in the "Japan-China Joint Study of History Research Committee", and the "Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security". Recently, he was inaugurated as a member of "the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century".

Valérie Niquet (Senior Research Fellow, Head of Asia Department, Foundation for Strategic Research (FSR))



Valerie Niquet, PhD Pol.Sc. MA Chinese, BA Japanese, (University of Paris), was formerly the Director of Asia Centre IFRI (Institut Français des Relations Internationales) where she built new research programs on China, India and Japan. She has published extensively on strategic issues, international relations and defence policies in Asia as well as the evolutions of the Chinese political system. She is a translator of major Chinese military classics (including *The Art of War* by Sun Zi). Her latest publications include "Confu-talk: the Use of Confucian Concepts in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy", in Anne-Marie Brady, *China's Thought Management*, Routledge, 2011, *Chine-Japon, l'affrontement*, Paris, Perrin, 2006.

Edward Schwarck (Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI))



Edward Schwarck is Research Fellow, Asia Studies at the Royal United Services Institute. He manages the Institute's Asia Programme and his research focuses on regional security in the Asia-Pacific, Chinese foreign and security policy, and elite level politics. Edward lived for over three years in the People's Republic of China, including one year in Xinjiang, and speaks Mandarin Chinese fluently. He has led RUSI research projects on Sino-Indian relations in Afghanistan, cross-strait relations, the UK's security relationship with Japan, and China's North Korea policy. He is a regular commentator in the media on Asia-Pacific affairs and China's far west.

Rizal Sukma (Executive Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS))



Since receiving a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1997, he has worked extensively on such issues as Southeast Asian security, ASEAN, Indonesia's defence and foreign policy, military reform, Islam and politics, and domestic political changes in Indonesia. Dr Sukma has served as a member of the National Committee on Strategic Defence Review at the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia. He became the first Indonesian to receive the Nakasone Award, in July 2005, and was named one of 100 Global Thinkers in 2009 by *Foreign Policy* magazine.

Patrick Cronin (Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security (CNAS))



Dr. Patrick Cronin was the Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, where he simultaneously oversaw the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. Reflecting his rich and diverse background in both Asian-Pacific security and U.S. defense, foreign and development policy, he has also held senior positions at other organizations, including the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Dr. Cronin has taught at Georgetown University and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Choi Wooseon (Associate Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)



Dr. Choi Woosen was an Assistant Professor in the School of American and International Studies at Ramapo College in New Jersey, prior to his current appointment. His publications include “China’s Growing A2/AD Capabilities and the U.S. Response”, *IFANS Analysis of International Affairs* (September 2011), and “Structural Realism and Dulles’s China Policy,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2012). He has conducted research on international security, US-China relations, American foreign policy, and East Asian security. He received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago in 2005.

William Choong (Senior Fellow, IISS Asia)



Dr William Choong has had a lengthy career with Singapore’s main English-language newspaper, *The Straits Times*, where he has most recently been Senior Writer responsible for opinion pieces and editorials, focusing on defence, diplomacy and US policy in Asia. He wrote his PhD at the Australian National University (2005–9) on US–China deterrence. While he is an Asian security specialist with a particular focus on major power relations, he has broader interests and has written widely for his newspaper on international-security issues. He joined IISS–Asia in February 2013.

Michael Fullilove (Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy)




Dr Michael Fullilove has been associated with the Lowy Institute since its establishment. He has also worked as a Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, an adviser to Prime Minister Paul Keating, and a lawyer. He remains a Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings. He writes widely on Australian foreign policy, US foreign policy and global issues in publications including *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Foreign Policy*, *Foreign Affairs*, as well as the Australian press.

Hoang Anh Tuan (Director General, Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam)



Dr Hoang Anh Tuan served as minister counselor at the Embassy of Vietnam in Washington, D.C. from March 2007 to September 2010. Before taking up his position at the Embassy of Vietnam, he was deputy director-general and director of research at the Hanoi-based Institute for International Relations—the predecessor of the Diplomacy Academy of Vietnam and a leading think-tank on international relations in Vietnam. He received his PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

Matake Kamiya (Professor, National Defense Academy, Japan)



Matake Kamiya is also editor-in-chief of *Discuss Japan - Japan Foreign Policy Forum* (<http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/>), and visiting superior research fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations. He served as adjunct research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs during 2004-2005. His current research interests include the U.S.-Japan security relations, Japanese foreign and security policies, the Asia-Pacific security, nuclear issues including Japan's (non-)nuclear policy, and Japanese-style realism (*genjitsu-shugi*)

Rodman Bundy (Director, Dispute Resolution Group, Eversheds LLP)



Mr. Bundy is a member of the New York bar and former member of the Paris bar, and currently practices out of the Singapore office of the law firm Eversheds LLP. He has acted for some thirty years as counsel and advocate in more than 25 cases before the International Court of Justice and international arbitral tribunals involving issues of disputed sovereignty, maritime delimitation and State responsibility. Most recently, Mr. Bundy has appeared in the Cambodia/Thailand case involving the interpretation of the ICJ's judgment in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, the Pedra Branca case between Singapore and Malaysia, the Peru-Chile maritime delimitation case, the Nicaragua-Colombia sovereignty and delimitation case and the Slovenia-Croatia boundary arbitration.

Kazuhiro Nakatani (Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, University of Tokyo)




Professor Kazuhiro Nakatani is a Professor of International Law at the University of Tokyo. He was a Visiting Scholar at the University of Oxford (1988-89). He is now a member of the Science Council of Japan, a member of the Cyber Security Strategic Headquarters at the Prime Minister's Office, and the Secretary-General of the International Law Association Japan Branch.

Henry Bensurto Jr. (Consul General, San Francisco, PCG / Former Secretary-General of the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs Secretariat)



Mr. Henry Bensurto Jr. assumed his post as the Philippine Consul General to San Francisco in June 2014. He is a career diplomat and a respected member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and is currently one of the Philippines' leading experts on maritime security and the West Philippine Sea issue, being part of the Philippine team that filed the arbitration case against China on the West Philippine Sea, which is now pending before an Arbitral Tribunal in the Hague. Prior to his current posting in San Francisco, he served as the Secretary-General of the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs Secretariat (CMOAS), a cabinet-level inter-agency coordinating body on the Law of the Sea and other maritime issues.

Zack Cooper (Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Japan Chair)



Zack Cooper is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on Asian security issues. Mr. Cooper is also a doctoral candidate in security studies at Princeton University. Prior to joining CSIS, he served on the White House staff as assistant to the deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism. He also worked as a civil servant in the Pentagon, first as a foreign affairs specialist and then as a special assistant to the principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

Tetsuo Kotani (Senior Fellow, JIIA)



Mr. Kotani's research focus is the US-Japan alliance and maritime security. He was a visiting scholar at CSIS Japan Chair and US-Japan Center at Vanderbilt University. He received a security studies fellowship from the RIPS in 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize. He has published numerous articles both in English and Japanese, and his recent English publications include "The Senkaku Islands and the US-Japan Alliance" (Project 2049 Institute, March 2013), and "US-Japan Allied Maritime Strategy: Balancing the Rise of Maritime China" (CSIS, April 2014). He is preparing his first book on maritime security. He received a master's degree from Doshisha University.

Nguyen Lan Anh (Deputy Director-General, Institute for South China Sea Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam)



Deputy Director-General of the Institute for East Sea (South China Sea) Studies and Vice Dean of the Faculty of Law at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, she teaches various topics in public international law including the law of the sea, dispute settlement and sources of law. She was also a Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (2013) and a Visiting Research Fellow at Center for International Law (CIL), National University of Singapore (2010). She has conducted a number of studies on the law of the sea and dispute settlement, with an emphasis on South China Sea issues.

Elina Noor (Assistant Director, Foreign Policy and Security Studies, ISIS Malaysia)



Elina Noor worked at the Brookings Institution and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies in Washington, DC. Her policy interests cover Asia-Pacific security relations, and strategic cyber security. Elina's commentaries have appeared in local and foreign media, including *The New Straits Times*, *the New York Times* and *Al-Jazeera*. She obtained an LLM in Public International Law from the London School of Economics and Political Science, graduating with distinction at the top of her class.

Kurt Campbell (CEO, The Asia Group / Former United States Assistant Secretary of State)



Kurt Campbell is Co-Founder and former CEO of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and currently serves as Chairman of its Board of Directors. Kurt Campbell is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Asia Group, LLC, a strategic advisory and investment group specializing in the dynamic and fast growing Asia Pacific region. From 2009 to 2013, he served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he is widely credited as being a key architect of the "pivot to Asia."

Yoshiji Nogami (President, JIIA)



Yoshiji Nogami is President and Director General of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Executive Advisor to Mizuho Bank, Limited. From 2004 to 2008, he was Japanese Ambassador to the UK. After graduating from the University of Tokyo in 1966, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he served as Deputy Director-General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau and the Foreign Policy Bureau, Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. His overseas posts include Economic Counsellor at the Embassy of Japan in the US, Consul-General in Hong Kong and Ambassador to the OECD in Paris. He was a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Summary

Welcoming Remarks:

Yoshiji Nogami (President, JIIA)

2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and Japan is also seeing various discussions taking place on this topic. Japan has an enormous responsibility to uphold and fortify the “rule of law” underpinning the international system built on the rules established over these past 70 years. Moreover, Japan needs to consider what Western nations and countries in the Asia-Pacific region expect from it. I hope that we can debate a broad range of topics today, including these points.

Opening Remarks:

Eriko Yamatani (Minister in charge of Ocean Policy and Territorial Integrity)

As symbolized by the terrorism incidents occurring throughout the world, the international society today is facing an increasing diversification of threats as globalization progresses. Recently, Japan also suffered the tragic incident of the death of two Japanese nationals in Syria. Moreover, as evident in the situation in the Ukraine and the East and South China Sea, there has been a spate of attempts to unilaterally change the status quo of the liberal international order through the use of force.

No single nation alone can secure peace in the international society. The Abe Administration’s policy on this is for Japan to proactively contribute, even more than it has thus far, to securing peace and prosperity in the international society, and to raise high the flag of “proactive contribution to peace” built on the principle of international contribution, so as to extend the established experiences and successes of Japan to countries and regions around the world.

Last May at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Prime Minister Abe proposed three principles for the rule of law at sea. Japan will continue to maintain its firm stance and level-headed approach to actions involving Japan’s territory, territorial waters and airspaces, and will aim for a peaceful resolution of the issues at hand. At the same time, it will also endeavor to improve relations with its principal neighboring countries of China and Korea.

I hope that at this Symposium, we will be able to gather wisdom to devise measures for ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asian region, and for

further strengthening the underlying rule of law thereof.

Part I “Challenges Facing the Liberal International Order and Japan’s Role”

Keynote Speech: “Challenges Facing the Liberal International Order and Japan’s Role”

Richard Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations):

Nowadays, the liberal international order is being challenged, both structurally as well as intellectually and politically. There is also a broadening view that sovereignty is not an absolute but conditional; basically, it is a new notion that regards sovereignty as involving obligations, and that sovereignty can be forfeited if those obligations are not fulfilled.

The liberal international order is also being challenged by the rise of non-state actors, such as ISIS/ISIL. Moreover, globalization is making it difficult for states to control the enormous level of exchange across its borders, such as human viruses and computer viruses, the movement of people, goods and services, and greenhouse gases, etc.

Put simply, the world is facing multiple challenges, and is actually less orderly and less liberal than before as a result. There are also some who view the situation in the Middle East as no longer being resolvable. Meanwhile, the liberal international order is being increasingly diminished in the Ukraine due to Russia’s movements there. There are concerns that a similar situation could also occur in the Baltic states, and that will be a challenge for obviously the members of NATO, but indeed the world to contend with.

Here in the Asia-Pacific, the liberal order has largely held for several decades. It’s been rather extraordinary, because it’s held amidst unprecedented economic growth. On the other hand, there are also several issues facing the Asia-Pacific region, including conflicting territorial claims, poor bilateral relations, the rise of nationalism, the specific nature of North Korea, the weakness of regional institutions.

Some of the forces of anarchy have gained some ground, which is a troubling sign. However, there are limits to what the US can and will do, and unilateralism is rarely an effective option. There is a lack of consensus in the US on what it should do in the world; the US thus needs the help and support of partners to promote order at both national and global levels.

Japan becoming an even less limited partner, in terms of what it can do in Asia-Pacific and the world, is likely to be beneficial for both sides. This will require open debate in Japan on the future and role of its people, politicians and government. I

welcome a more developed US-Japanese partnership.

Order will not simply emerge naturally; it requires a “visible hand” to maintain and preserve it, and calls for joint efforts to establish rules in a collective undertaking rather than by a single nation. The US seeks to form alliances with Japan and India, and places particular emphasis on the very important Japan-US partnership.

Panel Discussion 1: “Challenges Facing the Liberal International Order and Japan’s Role”

Yoshiji Nogami (President, JIIA/Moderator):

The liberal international order in Asia is gently yet firmly being challenged. Japan is one of the nations to have most benefitted from the liberal international order in the 70 years since the end of World War II. Japan now needs to consider what role it should play in Asia-Pacific and the world, and also what Western nations and countries in the Asia-Pacific region expect from it. I hope to hear a broad range of opinions on these topics from each panelist.

Shinichi Kitaoka (Dean, International University of Japan):

This modern day era has been dubbed “the age of new geopolitics”, and our commitment to “resolving international disputes without the use of force” – stemming from having experienced two major world wars – is a particularly noteworthy event in the history of humankind.

The US has switched from an emphasis on sanctions to a policy of engagement in its dealings with Myanmar, which is bringing increasing stability to the relations between the two countries. Moreover, the US is now also considering changing its policy on Cuba. Following on from this, the US must also improve relations with Iran. Formerly it was Japan that patiently pursued universal principles.

As for Japan’s role, firstly it needs to bolster its deterrent force to prevent China from exerting its power in the surrounding areas of the East China Sea. In regard to the South China Sea, Japan must also strengthen alliances with other nations that observe the rule of law in the ocean. Accordingly, Japan needs to acquire the military power to back such actions, and so the formulation of the Principles on the Export of Defense Equipment can be regarded as useful in this aspect. In order to contribute to world peace by taking the middle ground, Japan must take a step forward from its non-military position. Such thinking shares common ground with the Abe Administration’s “Proactive Contribution to Peace”.

Valérie Niquet (Senior Research Fellow, Foundation for Strategic Research):

The Philippines recently decided to present its case concerning the South China Sea dispute with the China to the International Court of Law. Vietnam and ASEAN member countries have also demonstrated their interest in the matter. With China trying to establish the legitimacy of its actions, Japan is expected to fulfill its role as a normative state for ensuring stability. This can also be regarded as important for European nations.

Since the 1980s, there has been a growing momentum of democratization in Asia, and Japan has become the democratic state of Asia. Meanwhile, China's assertive foreign strategy has become a destabilizing factor in Asia. In response, non-official allies advocating similar norms have emerged around the world, and Japan is now expected to fulfil its positive and normative key role at both a regional and global level. Many of Japan's partners both within and outside the Asia-Pacific region already acknowledge this.

Edward Schwarck (Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)):

There isn't really a clear in and out option when it comes to the international liberal order. Countries tend to follow aspects of international order that is in line with their national interests.

Last year, China announced its greenhouse gas reduction targets at the APEC meeting in Beijing. Some people look at these developments like these and say that China is becoming a responsible stakeholder. In other areas, such as its conduct at sea or in human rights, China is becoming even more intransigent to the views of the international society. This is a zero-sum game which has the potential to generate conflict.

By taking part in the counter-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia, Japan has established its position as a net-contributor nation to international security. The force exerted from China regarding territorial issues is not only testing relations with Japan, but also with its US-led alliances. In confronting to this challenge, the Japanese government has been quiet but resolute.

While China is adept at shaping domestic public opinion, the Abe administration is focused on public diplomacy; although the inconsistency of its message impacts Japan's narrative.

Put simply, how does a country present its narrative? The story that a country presents about itself will affect how other countries interpret its actions. To create an effective narrative, the government and all its institutions, as well as public services, all have to be on the same page, so that a consistent message can be communicated to the

people.

Agonizing over how to control such discussions on the trajectory of Japan will lead to a situation where national debate follows that of the hostile nations, even while foreign policy itself appears to be working. The legacy of war has created complex relations with Korea, which should be Japan's most important potential ally.

Rizal Sukma (Executive Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)):

Although I'm not particularly fond of the term "liberal", it is liberal international order created by the US-led benign hegemony that allowed peace and prosperity to flourish in East Asia. However, it is difficult for the US to continue to solely exert leadership; as such, Asian nations have started to branch out from relying on the US alone.

China, however, will not replace the US. Why is that we haven't yet seen a China-led international order? It is because China has no intention of doing so. It continues to call itself a developing nation, and hence this makes it difficult to shoulder the responsibility of leading the international order. The notion of Pax Sinica is still unthinkable.

So what is expected of Japan here? It is important that Japan continues with its proactive contribution to peace; and it should also build forward-looking relations with China and Korea.

Japan also needs to facilitate China's integration into the existing international order. For instance, it should view the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a part of the existing international financial system comprising the World Bank, IMF and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), etc.

The international liberal order is basically anchored in the liberal democracy traditions. So Japan should step up its role in supporting the basic values of the international order. Japan needs to focus on the importance of the international process in East Asia, and push further ahead with UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea).

Discussion

President Nogami:

We've heard from the panelists about the importance of each country communicating its narrative or story. I think it's significant that the Advisory Panel on the History of the

20th Century and on Japan's Role and the World Order in the 21st Century was established.

Dr. Kitaoka:

The media's interest in the 70th anniversary statement since the end of World War II is whether or not specific keywords have been included. However, I believe it is important to look back on the past as a whole. I find it to be a contradiction how this is being covered by the media that lauds the speech of the former President of Germany, Richard Von Weizsäcker.

According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, over 80% of Japanese recognize Japan to be a peaceful nation. So I'd like this intangible consensus that the majority of Japanese already have to become something tangible.

President Nogami:

In other words, a new model of major power relations will be an answer for coexistence with China. What are your thoughts on needing to place China, which is currently on the top floor of the condominium of major powers, down on the second floor?

Dr. Haass:

To what extent should we consider the internal order of other nations? You could say this is the key issue in debate on US foreign policy. Even looking at Iraq, it's difficult for the US to have any influence on the domestic situation there.

China has already seized rapid urbanization and whatever other benefits that it can; although it is facing some major domestic issues. It is also unclear how China defines a success in its foreign policy, as it does not discern a clear strategic doctrine. China is benefitting from the international liberal order as well, but it doesn't have the luxury of becoming what Henry Kissinger called a revolutionary power.

Concluding the TPP and bolstering the presence of the US navy can be effective tools for keeping China in check. There are limits as to what China can achieve.

Dr. Niquet:

China's domestic challenges can also lead to more aggressive behavior outside in order to rebuild the legitimacy of a weakening party, the CCP. Deterrence is very important to deal with China. And one must be very careful about all the ambiguous concepts that China is ready to use, like the concept of relations between big powers.

Dr. Schwark:

China has come up with economic initiatives such as the new Silk Road Economic Belt

and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. However, its surrounding liberal allies must expand their own value by utilizing their respective soft power, as the values of the West are far more attractive. Ultimately, what we have to do is building an all-of-government message and providing a coherent explanation about the things we're trying to do.

President Nogami:

So now I'd like to open the floor for any questions or comments.

Henry Bensurto Jr. (Consul General, San Francisco, PCG/Philippines)

This question is for Dr. Sukma. Do you consider the reason for the existence of a trust deficit with China to be on China's side? Please share your view on this, based on the current facts.

Dr. Sukma:

The relation between states is actually has not only begin recently. The attempt at a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines has failed, and relations between the nations are deteriorating. Trust in Southeast Asia is fostered from cooperation and collaboration.

Dr. Mizuguchi (Keiai University):

This question is for Dr. Haass. Do you think the US can build friendly relations with Iran? Also, what do you consider Japan's role to be in securing peace in the Middle East?

Dr. Haass:

Although the US is aiming to have a final agreement with Iran by the end of June, I don't think it will be easy to achieve. It is trying to reach some official and non-official agreements on Iran's development of nuclear weapons. The goal is to work out something that both sides can agree on.

Peace in the Middle East is not going to happen. Indeed, things are more likely to get worse. The refugee problem in Jordan, the threat of ISIS in Saudi Arabia, and the issues in Iraq and Syria – all of these will continue. And the situation in Israel and Palestine is not expected to improve either.

Japan can provide assistance with refugees, particularly in Jordan, which may be able to support maritime openness. So if Japan can fulfill that role, it will also have a substantial effect on Japan's energy imports.

Dr. Niquet:

Considering the worsening situation in the Middle East, do you think it might lead to a re-balancing of US strategy towards the Middle East from the Asia-Pacific? The Chinese are very much expecting it.

Dr. Haass:

No, I don't particularly think so. The kinds of forces that are really called upon in the Asia-Pacific are air and naval forces. The Trans-Pacific Partnership in no way should be contingent on what goes on in the Middle East. The United States has to spend its current level of defense spending more intelligently. It cannot lose sight of its priorities in its policies, nor should it take its eyes off Asia either.

Dr. Kitaoka:

I think peace in the Middle East is too lofty of a goal to set; in order to achieve a more realistic goal, we need to work on improving relations with Iran.

Dr. Haass:

When setting foreign policy, we need to avoid the worst-case situation from happening. There are two rules for this: the first is after things gets worse, they can get even worse, and the second is that the enemy of your enemy can still be your enemy.

President Nogami:

Now we will take a short break for lunch, and then I'd like to continue this discussion in the afternoon.

(Lunch break)

Part II “Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific and Expectations of Japan”

Keynote Speech: “Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific and Expectations of Japan”

Patrick Cronin (Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security (CNAS)):

There’s no consensus on security, even in the United States. Japan and the US need to pay great heed to ISIS, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the threat of North Korea. While it’s important to seek diplomatic soft landings, we must also remain vigilant to maintain our deterrent forces.

My expectations for Japan are mostly extensions of what I expect from the United States. That is, to continue working with other nations to build and uphold a rule-based inclusive system for realizing a liberal world order. Japan has an impeccable track record over the past 70 years in regard to this.

On this 70th anniversary since the end of World War II, I would like to suggest a three-part formulation for Japan: one, sincere remorse and respect for the past; two, deep pride in Japan’s 70 year contribution to building regional and global order; and three, an inspiring and positive vision for the region’s future.

China leaders are continuing to probe and challenge the international system, with creeping assertions of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. They are trying to enforce rules that do not lead to war. Beijing's growing assertiveness in maritime Asia is exerting influence on the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.

The diffusion of power we are seeing now is requiring the United States to work with other nations even more than before. China’s salami-slicing technique is manifested through a variety of coercive actions, such as creating a set of artificial islands in the South China Sea. While we should oppose China’s show of force in the seas, it is also important we ensure the integration of a rising China. However, if China is left to do as it pleases, we will see an Asian type of Finlandization.

There’s a third way between capitulation and conflict; we must endeavor to impose costs on coercion, to deter intimidation, and to offset any unilateral changes to the status quo that China may derive through assertiveness. We should also support actions like that taken by the Philippines in its arbitration case on the South China Sea.

In China’s view, anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities can also be used by other countries for defense. Meanwhile, the sharing of space information and Big Data may enable a new type of defense cooperation.

China and the US are currently negotiating a memorandum of understanding

(MOU) on avoiding collisions at sea between naval ships, and also on mid-air collisions between aircrafts; these MOU could also be worked out between Tokyo and Beijing. The United States and Japan must create comprehensive rules and follow through with its rebalance policy for the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and Japan also need to promptly move ahead with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Trade Promotion Authority, which are also vital in this.

Panel Discussion 2: “Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific and Expectations of Japan”

Yoshiji Nogami (President, JIIA/Moderator):

What is happening nowadays in the Asia-Pacific region? How should countries in the Asia-Pacific region come together to tackle the issues, while working within a bilateral security framework? And what role should Japan play in this? I’d like us to discuss these issues in this panel discussion.

Choi Wooseon (Associate Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy):

The rise of China has become a key factor, and we are seeing a changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. However, China’s power should not be exaggerated. The United States continues to maintain its overwhelming military and economic superiority in this region, and has become a powerful balancing force in Asia. The United States is seeking to avoid an arms race with China, through a combined policy of engagement and balancing in its dealings with them.

The Japan-US alliance is a key element for overall regional stability. Amid its lingering post-war legacy, Japan needs to continue pursuing an even more restrained policy with China. It is also imperative to maintain the Japan-US alliance in light of a widening gap between China and Japan in the future.

A concern is that if Japan over-engages in mobilization politics, it may become entrapped in hyper-nationalism, and this could harm its relations with neighboring countries. Furthermore, establishing a crisis management system for territorial disputes based on multinational cooperative relationships requires efforts to enhance transparency and develop a process for cultivating military-to-military trust. So in that sense also, Japan has a lot to offer in this region.

There will be no peace between the North and South unless the North Korea nuclear issue is resolved; this is imperative for ensuring regional stability. There needs to be close coordination among concerned parties to come up with a comprehensive action plan, so that North Korea is forced into making a decision. Also, Japan cannot

move forward in its relations with Korea unless the comfort women issue is resolved.

William Choong (Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow, IISS):

Why is it that Singapore is suspicious of major powers? It's our mindset that they're out to get us. China is currently trying to make the Johnson South Reef into an artificial island. So how can we stop this salami-slicing technique of China? China is gradually building an Asian-type international framework comprising the AIIB and RCEP, etc. It's quite adept at operating below the thresholds, below the limits.

The regional expectations for Japan are to reinterpret Article 9 of its pacifist Constitution, which would enable it to practice collective self-defense for the benefit of surrounding countries.

Although China is reclaiming islands in the South China Sea and building airstrips on them, other countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have also conducted land reclamation on the South China Sea islands that they control. If we want China to govern in accordance with the law, we must find a way for that to happen.

When it comes to the issue of Japan acknowledging its wartime history, there is no doubt that China does play the history card against Japan, with Korea also raising the comfort women issue. Although Japan has already issued an apology for its wartime deeds, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, it needs a way to once again recover its face. Take the actions of the (then) Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001, when he paid a silent tribute at Memorial Museum of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War, and hence obtained a certain level of understanding from the Chinese.

Singapore's first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, raised the issue of "whether Japan can be a major force in this region, even though it still hasn't had a historical catharsis". His son and the current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong commented to the Japan Times that, "unless comfort women, aggression, and other World War II-related issues are put behind, I think this is going to be a continuing sore".

Michael Fullilove (Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy):

The world is changing. First of all wealth and power are moving eastwards towards us in Australia; and secondly, our great and powerful friends are relatively less great and powerful than they once were. The security of Asia is unclear, and there is also the possibility of mounting conflict between nations.

Public opinion in Australia on China is bifurcated. Last year, Prime Minister Abbott called Japan Australia's "best friend" in Asia. The 2014 Lowy Institute poll revealed Australians view Japan and China almost equally as Australia's best friends in

Asia, but at the same time almost half of the population (48%) believe it is likely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next twenty years.

The challenge posed by China is unlike anything the United States has faced before; however, the US has become inwardly focused. I am skeptical of rebalancing the status quo in Asia; has America even seriously attempted to do this? President Obama is preoccupied by the Middle East situation, and he has become distracted. I wonder whether the United States has the will to face up to both Russia and China at once. Secretary Kerry has hardly visited the Asia-Pacific region. So it's safe to say that the rebalancing of Asia is not a top priority of US leaders, and there are also forced budget cuts to consider.

There is uncertainty about both China's role in Asia, and the US role in Asia. So what does this mean for Japan and Australia? The answer is that countries such as Japan and Australia need to get larger. We need to step up. Australia needs to expand its talks on foreign policy; although with the country going through a rotation of five prime ministers in eight years, right now Japan's political scene is more stable than in Australia.

My expectations for Japan are to express remorse as well as quiet pride, and a vision for the future. My advice for Japan would be to not give its rivals the upper hand and afford them a free kick.

We need to thicken cooperation between Australia and Japan in areas such as defense, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, within the triangular Japan-US-Australia relationship; and we also need to have a broader base in our relations. This is led from the top by Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Abbott, who remain on very good terms.

Hoang Anh Tuan (Director General, Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies):

The land reclamation in the South China Sea by the Philippines and Vietnam has been conducted differently to that of China's reclaiming of islands in the South China Sea. China is taking a single rock and building huge a new island from it about 100 times the original size.

Looking at this region, the first issue to address is the nuclear situation in the Korean Peninsula. Territorial issues centering on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also impacting regional security issues. China has constructed oil rigs in Vietnam's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and as result, the Vietnamese have never become so angry about China's behavior for more than a half- or quarter-of-a-century. The conflicts in the East

China Sea have the potential to affect global security. As such, it's important to hold discussions for facilitating fair and open talks on all sides.

So what do ASEAN countries expect of Japan? About fifteen or twenty years ago, we would have replied, "we cannot expect anything from Japan." Back then, Japan was confined by its Pacifist Constitution, and its total national defense budget was about 1% of the country's GDP. However, now we have high expectations of Japan.

First, we want Japan to continue to pursue its current proactive diplomacy, and to help strengthen and consolidate the existing institutions in the region. This was clearly expressed in a firm statement by Prime Minister Abe at the Shangri-La Dialogue. We also want Japan to work more closely with the United States, while also encouraging the United States to work with other countries here as well, so as to bring about peace and stability in the region. The US presence in this region is no longer viewed as a threat; rather, it is now recognized as having some positive elements. We also want Japan to help ASEAN countries to invest more in infrastructure, and promote educational and cultural exchanges.

Matake Kamiya (Professor, National Defense Academy):

The strong impression I have garnered from the speeches I have heard so far is that the experts from each country are in favor of Japan's proactive contribution to peace.

Post-war pacifism in Japan had two passive aspects. The first was Japan vowing after the war to "never destroy peace again"; however, it lacked the thinking that Japan should be playing a role (other than self-defense) to build and maintain peace. The second passive aspect was for the post-war Japanese to regard peace and military force as being fundamentally opposed to one another, and to harbor a growing refusal to acknowledge the use of military force for the sake of peace.

The first passive aspect has been largely resolved, although the Japanese remain strongly reluctant to admit the use of military force for the sake of peace. Prime Minister Abe's advocacy of a proactive contribution to peace can be understood as a way for Japan to resolve the remaining issue, namely overcoming the second passive aspect of post-war pacifism.

Considering the stability of liberal order in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan must become a partner not just to the United States, but also with Asian countries and Australia; and we should become partners with these countries without having any unnecessary limitations. If we don't do that, then we cannot sufficiently counter China and put a stop to its salami-slicing technique. We also cannot provide ample support for the capacity-building of Southeast Asia, and also we won't be able to adequately

counter terrorism or piracy either.

Japan should continue to reject a military-centrism while shouldering its international duties more proactively. The model for this was already purported at the end of the 1960s, in a paper written by my father, Fuji Kamiya, in 1969:

“Japan must continue its restraint in taking action of some kind. However, the theme for the country in the 1970s is to do something for Asia instead of just retiring into its shell. If that is case, there is a need to convert our pacifism from a negative and passive one to a more active and positive one. I believe Japan must think of something independently and develop original schemes for approaching it in order to bear its international responsibilities more proactively while continuing to exclude military-centrism.”

The issue confronting Japan now is whether we can finally realize this.

Question and Answer Session:

President Nogami:

I would now like to open the floor to comments and questions.

Henry Bensurto Jr. (Consul General, San Francisco, PCG/Philippines):

I'd like to state that the rise of China is not an exaggeration for those who are on the front line of their assault.

President Nogami:

There is a severe gap among countries in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of their capacity of domain awareness and maritime domain awareness. In order to raise the costs of taking assertive measures, we need to assist surrounding countries to have a greater awareness of the maritime domains. Japan, the US, and Australia should build a framework for this to the best of their ability, and work together with ASEAN countries to address these issues.

(Break)

Part III “*Maritime Security and Management of Ocean Environment in East Asia*”

Kazuhiro Nakatani (Professor, University of Tokyo / Moderator):

The rule of law forms an essential premise for the stability and prosperity of the international community. And it could be said to possess important meaning in the maritime environment in particular. In order to preserve order in the navigation, resources, and environment of the oceans, it is vital for all the relevant countries to abide by international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Keynote Speech: “*Maritime Security and Management of Ocean Environment in East Asia*”

Rodman Bundy (Director, Dispute Resolution Group, Eversheds LLP):

International law does not operate in a vacuum. Legal, political, economic, security, and environmental elements are all linked when it comes to considering how to manage and resolve the complex maritime issues that exist in this region.

There are four key legal issues that have implications for maritime security and ocean management in the region.

1. Who has sovereignty over the islands situated throughout the region?
2. What is the nature and extent of the maritime entitlements that islands give rise to?
3. How will the delineation of maritime boundaries between East Asian States take place?
4. Are certain coastal States entitled to claim a continental shelf extending more than 200 nautical miles from their baselines?

It is axiomatic under international law that the land dominates the sea. Paragraph 3, Article 121 of the Law of the Sea Convention provides, on an exceptional basis, that “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” So, is it possible to call an artificially-made rock an island? The law is not clear on the issue. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Court of Arbitration have not necessarily clarified the interpretation either. State practice is equally sparse.

What scenarios can be envisaged for dealing with sovereignty and delineation issues in the maritime areas off East Asia? First, disputes can be resolved through bilateral negotiations. Conceivably, some maritime boundaries in the region can be successfully negotiated. However, successfully negotiating sovereignty disputes will be

difficult.

There are also a number of successful examples of third party arbitration, such as between Yemen and Eritrea, and Croatia and Slovenia, in the 1990s. But are East Asian States willing to submit their disputes to third party resolution? As matters currently stand, the answer is probably “no”. There is a preference to settle matters bilaterally, and jurisdictional limitations also exist. One could argue that this is clearly visible from China’s vehement reaction to the UNCLOS arbitration proceedings instituted by the Philippines. Japan has participated fully in ICJ cases with other States concerning the southern bluefin tuna and whaling.

In the 1990s, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to submit their dispute over two small islands lying off the east coast of Borneo to the ICJ. Singapore and Malaysia subsequently followed suit. More recently, Bangladesh submitted its respective maritime boundary disputes with Myanmar and India.

It is not just smaller nations. In the 1950s the U.K. and France submitted their dispute over the Minquiers and Ecrehos islands to the ICJ. In the 1980s the US and Canada also submitted the Gulf of Maine maritime boundary decision. Incredibly, Egypt and Israel also submitted their dispute over the Sinai Peninsula. As this demonstrates, it is possible to resolve problems by third party settlement, but it requires a large dose of political will by the states concerned.

70 years ago, the regime of the continental shelves and EEZs did not exist. There was no ICJ or UNCLOS, and no International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea either. The new legal landscape has created enormous opportunities for states, but also huge new challenges.

Panel Discussion 3: “*Maritime Security and Management of Ocean Environment in East Asia*”

Henry Bensurto Jr. (Consul General, San Francisco, PCG / Former Secretary-General of the Commission on Maritime and Ocean Affairs Secretariat (CMOAS)):

The Philippines is not trying to make an enemy of China. We consider China a very important neighbor. However, we cannot be friends shaking hands if your foot is on my foot. In order to achieve a balanced coexistence, if negative points exist they need to be pointed out. That is the background to the China lawsuit in the South China Sea.

The appeasement policy toward China has begun to have an adverse effect. There

has to be a strengthening of the rule of law in terms of the South China Sea. The challenge, however, is how that abstract idea is to be realized.

Asia is achieving dynamic, trade-driven economic growth. Currently, Asia is involved in 38% of global trade. Trade is carried out using marine transportation, and the flow of goods must be unimpeded, and that includes risk premiums, such as rising insurance costs.

Coastal countries' valid maritime interests, including EEZs and continental shelves, are being infringed. This is the foot that I was referring to, which is on my foot. All the countries concerned need to understand that international law is the only means of resolving disputes. UNCLOS is a very important document. We have to understand why the world got together at a certain point in history and came up with this constitution of the oceans.

The pace of reclamation is much faster than the pace by which the code of conduct is happening. It will make the code of conduct irrelevant in the *fait accompli* actually.

The order of law must be considered in combination with capacity building. This can also be described as deterrence. Security abhors a vacuum. The Philippines is in a more difficult position than Malaysia and Indonesia. In order to become partners, mistakes must be pointed out and correct behavior encouraged. That will lead to order in international law.

Zack Cooper (Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)):

Over the past five years, China has noticeably increased pressure on neighboring countries. It is increasing naval activity in the East China Sea, challenging other countries' territorial claims using the People's Liberation Army Navy, including announcing the ADIZ, constructing facilities on the Spratly Islands, and increasing efforts to project power into the Western Pacific.

China's maritime activities in the East China Sea increased dramatically from September 2012 and continue today. The ADIZ that China announced differs from declarations made by other countries up to now. To begin with, it overlaps with an existing ADIZ, and has been made to cover aircraft in the vicinity of China's national border. That China did not engage in any prior consultation with its neighbors whatsoever is also a significant difference.

Recently China has been carrying out construction activities vigorously on the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. Large-scale infrastructure is being constructed in short periods of time on Woody Island, Johnson South Reef, Gaven Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef.

What can be done to oppose this? Now is a time of strategy transition for China, and it is attempting to project power in the first island chain. And I would guess that we'll see them trying to project power out to the second island chain.

Leaving aside nuclear and conventional military strength, the problem is the grey zone represented by the coast guard forces. The escalation doesn't rise to an Article V commitment. The allies and partners don't yet have a strategy or how to deal with those gray zone problems.

A more forceful response needs to be taken to the events occurring in the East China Sea, but things are not going well. Views of the risks differ. We have accepted what China has been doing because we have not allowed ourselves to increase the risk in those areas.

Of the four policy options, the first is an increased use of US coast guard and even naval patrols in disputed areas. This discussion has just begun in Washington.

Secondly, more active support should be given to legal solutions. Thirdly, we're going to have to think of economic responses to coercive actions. Fourthly, capacity building is going to be absolutely critical.

Tetsuo Kotani (Senior Fellow, JIIA):

Why is the rule of law at sea faltering in Asia? It will not be possible to establish the rule of law without understanding that. The first cause that can be cited is the lack of any consensus on how to draw maritime boundaries in postwar Asia. None of Japan's immediate neighbors are parties to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and are not bound by its provisions.

Circumstances in the South China Sea are even more complex. On top of the fact that each country's interpretation of the treaty differs, China is not a party to the treaty, and it has drawn a "nine-dotted line" in the South China Sea and declared territorial rights to all of the islands within it based on a historical claim dating back 2000 years. The grounds on which countries are asserting their territorial claims differ, making the problem all the more difficult.

Emerging countries such as China and India are on the rise in the international community on the one hand; while on the other, US leadership in maintaining the international order has been diminishing in relative terms. Against this backdrop, a move by some coastal countries to seek to change the status quo is being witnessed.

Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party is not subject to the rule of law, but instead, they are doing rule by law. It is rule by law rather than rule of law. It is important to consider policies after first understanding the complexities of establishing

the rule of law in Asia's seas.

The Pacific War was a fight for control of Asia's seas. Because Japan sought to monopolize Asia's seas, it ended up warring with countries such as the US and the U.K., causing great harm to Asia and Japan in the process. For the very reason that it had that experience, Japan needs to exercise more proactive leadership in the future and establish the rule of law in Asia's seas.

Japan's role to begin with is to ensure maritime domain awareness, in other words, accurately ascertain what is happening in Asia's seas. Next, Japan must take the initiative in diplomatic efforts to harmonize countries' differing interpretations of maritime law. Taking the discussion to the level of looking at the reasons why countries' interpretations differ will provide us with some clues on establishing the rule of law in Asia's seas, and I think this symposium will be one opportunity for doing that. However, this process will take time, and so in the meantime, a crisis management system needs to be established.

Discussions on maritime crisis management are ongoing between Japan and China and between the U.S. and China. If these efforts prove successful, they will contribute substantially to establishing the rule of law in Asia's seas.

Nguyen Lan Anh (Deputy Director-General, Institute for South China Sea Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam):

In East Asia, we see the competition is on the rise, whereas cooperation is in decline. Going forward, we want to increase cooperation. When competition increases marine biodiversity is lost. Natural resources are being over-exploited, land reclamation is taking place, fishing has been politicized, and territorial disputes are growing.

As described by UNCLOS, the pollution of the marine environment is defined as the harming of the marine environment as a result of the introduction of substances or energy by human beings. In the South China Sea, the reclamation of the sea and the construction of artificial structures are moving ahead one after another. China first began dredging in the Spratly Islands in 1988, and this has destroyed the coral reef, which also affects living organisms.

Fishing ban should be determined based on scientific analysis, but a political approach has ended up being adopted. Action needs to be taken after countries have undertaken discussion, such as at this symposium. It is possible to adopt an ecosystem approach – a sustainable development approach – and to conduct environmental impact assessments and identify harmful substances.

Maritime security cannot be accomplished by one country. Pollution of the seas

spreads through the water and leaves a negative legacy for future generations. In order to carry out joint research and information-sharing and implement conservation measures using a rule-based approach, and to cooperate in a semi-enclosed area, capacity is needed. The US' satellite images are useful in recognizing the environmental realities. And I hope that Japan will exercise leadership.

Elina Noor (Assistant Director, Foreign Policy and Security Studies, ISIS):

According to a report that ReCAAP (The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery) put out last year, piracy increased in and around Malaysia in particular.

Malaysia's position has been that the South China Sea dispute should not be internationalized, and that multi-party negotiations should occur within ASEAN overall, rather than bilaterally. Malaysia is the ASEAN chair country this year, and hopes to make even a small amount of progress with a code of conduct through pragmatic measures. And minor movements with regards to the COC would be considered an achievement by ASEAN standards.

Concerns about China are reaching a peak for Malaysia also. There is a disparity in size, in power, in influence and capacity among the different ASEAN member states; but each one can contribute to alleviating tensions, clarifying intentions, and ensuring adherence to international law.

The countries that Malaysia is involved in disputes with over the South China Sea include four ASEAN members. It is thus necessary to consider the resolution of territorial clashes among ASEAN members as well, not just disputes with China.

I am hopeful that Japan will contribute in the capacity-building area in particular. Demand for maritime domain awareness is extremely high in Southeast Asia.

Lastly, perspective is an equally important consideration in moving forward. An official looking out from a window in Beijing will have a very different viewpoint of global and regional security developments than one looking out from Washington or Malaysia. Nations are declaring their own ADIZs. Korea extended its ADIZ after China's declaration. There is no reason why emerging countries must not declare new ADIZs.

We should all strive towards the rule of law. However, we should also bear in mind that international law is not devoid of political considerations, and has been interpreted in different ways by different States.

Discussion

Prof. Nakatani:

In disputes concerning the delineation of maritime boundaries, it is possible not to accept the court process, and that is what China is proclaiming. However, Paragraph 3, Article 74 and Paragraph 3, Article 83 of UNCLOS determine that unilateral actions in connection with a continental shelf or EEZ will should not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.

That being the case, disputes about whether unilateral actions are legal or illegal are independent disputes that differ from disputes concerning the delineation of maritime boundaries, and so conceivably cannot be excluded from the court process. What are your thoughts on this point?

Additionally, based on UNCLOS, the countries concerned are to be bound by the findings of cases undertaken in court, but when a ratifying country does not abide by that, how should it be dealt with? Furthermore, how do you assess China's actions in the South China Sea?

Mr. Bensurto:

Whether or not China will adhere to the decision of a court of arbitration is unclear. In December, China came out with a position paper declaring its love for rule of law. That's a very good thing, and we hope that that expression is a real commitment.

Mr. Cooper:

Undoubtedly we should strengthen the deterrent posture. Currently things are progressing in a negative direction. Rather than simply hoping that China is going to adhere to UNCLOS, I think that there will be discussion, including in Washington, about whether to accept more risk and what to do about the grey zones.

Mr. Bundy:

Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, a failure to comply can be brought in front of the Security Council, but this is ineffective when the other party is a permanent member of the Security Council. The Philippines-China case is before an Annex VII tribunal. I think it was a good thing that China released the paper in December. The Philippines is commenting on that in writing. Let's see what the court's decision is. Where the issue of reclamation is concerned, the threat or the use of force is a violation of international law, but from the start, it is not clear who has the sovereign rights.

Special Speech: “Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific and Challenges Facing the US-Japan Alliance”

Kurt Campbell (CEO, The Asia Group / Former US Assistant Secretary of State):
At the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, it’s important to recognize what these last seventy years have meant to the Asia-Pacific region, the remarkable achievements that have taken place, and the contributions that Japan has made also.

The US-Japan alliance is entering its most significant period. I think the debate over the course of the coming year is likely to be defining for the period ahead. It could be called more significant than the Cold War. Public support for the US-Japan alliance should be utilized skillfully.

One challenge that the US and Japan must focus on in the future is achieving the conclusion of the TPP in two months’ time. The ROK, countries in Southeast Asia, and China also are expressing interest. The TPP will also contribute to the third arrow of Abenomics.

The Japanese people should ultimately decide the role that Japan fulfills in the world, including collective self-defense, security and Japan-US cooperation, but it will be important to express the intention to play a role in Asia.

There are two years left in President Obama’s term, and in the US intra-party debate is raging. Even in the Republican Party, there are people who hold the same view about international engagement as Roosevelt, and issues such as trade agreements and our defense spending are being debated.

Japan can continue to remind us of two things. The first is to remind us that the US has a critical role to play in the international arena, and express an expectation toward that as an ally and a friend. I think the second thing that Japan can make Democrats and Republicans aware of is that the 21st century is going to be written in Asia.

The last 50 years have been the best period in Asia’s history. This operating system must be expanded and moved forward. The same goes for China. Japan and the US have invested in China and imparted a system of resolving disputes peacefully and freedom of navigation. The role of the US and Japan must be conveyed in order to maintain this operating system.

Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan is performing a greater role on the international stage, and it will be important to deepen cooperation with Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and other countries and to strengthen ties between Japan and the US. Cooperation on the international framework that will sustain Asia, ASEAN regional forums and

international organizations like APEC will also be important.

In addition, the US wants to mediate between Tokyo and Seoul and support the creation of high-level political relations. Awareness and attitudes toward China differ greatly depending on the country, and amid that it will be necessary to strengthen strategic dialogue. Where the Senkaku and other islands are concerned also, support for Japan underpins peace and security, I believe. Ultimately, it will come down to how many values Japan and the US can share.

The most important strategic issues that will need to be debated include collective self-defense and the issue of Okinawa, cooperation in times of natural disaster and behavior in the international realm. And at the heart of that, hopefully, will be a much stronger economic and commercial relationship going forward. The relationship between Japan and the US is approaching an unprecedentedly important period. And we are prepared for that.

Closing Remarks

Yoshiji Nogami (President, JIIA):

It was pointed out that it will be very important for Japan to communicate a narrative or story based on its internal discussions on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. I would like to once again thank participants for the deeply meaningful discussion.

(END)

Essay

Shinichi Kitaoka

Geopolitics has once again become important. Universal principles are not necessarily being applied around the world, and the fact that power holds more sway than universal principles has become conspicuous in some regions.

The resurgence of geopolitics is a challenge to the post-World War II order. Having come through two world wars, humanity agreed on the fundamental principle of rejecting the use of armed force to resolve international disputes. This idea lies at the heart of the UN Charter and in the first part of Article 9 of Japan's Constitution (not to be confused with the latter part, which espouses a different principle).

The Cold War era saw numerous wars and US-Soviet confrontation but, with the two superpowers at the head of their respective camps, stability was maintained by alliances.

When the Cold War ended, it was thought that such universal principles as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market principles had won out, and there was even talk about the world being flat and history having ended.

That, of course, was an illusion. Growing interactions between differing civilizations and an absence of superpower-led camps as in the Cold War led to a rise in regional conflicts. The global propagation of technology broadened the extent and scale of conflicts, with 9-11 occurring as a result.

The US reached an impasse in its subsequent Middle East policy, and was dealt a heavy blow financially and economically by the 2008 Lehman Shock. As the US became bogged down, China made a remarkable rise.

One example of geopolitics' counteroffensive against universal principles is the issue of deploying missile defense systems in Poland. Missile defense is by its nature a defensive tool and, if Russia has no intention of launching a missile attack against Poland, then it has no need to worry.

However, this is Russia that we are talking about. As George Kennan noted with regard to its view of the outside world, Russia feels encircled and hence overreacts, and this remains true even now. This view born of geographical conditions and rooted in history will not readily change. States cannot simply break free of history and geography.

It was frightfully ignorant of President Bush to have once said that the US had

democratized Japan and Germany so it could democratize Iraq, too. Japan and Germany had previously made great progress toward democracy and were traditionally friendly to the US, factors absent in Iraq.

Even so, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economies are of decisive importance, and the world will likely proceed in that direction. The problem is how to move forward without confusion. Patient and strategic efforts will be needed to that end.

These have already begun. One instance is Myanmar. Unlike the US, which for many long years insisted on sanctions, Japan considered sanctions alone to be counterproductive, and instead stressed a patient approach that included engagement. Indeed, sanctions had pushed Myanmar toward China. A few years ago, the US switched to a policy of engagement, and the outcome has been that Myanmar continues to make positive progress.

Next, there is Cuba. There is no reason for the US to continue its dispute with Cuba now that the Cold War is over. Cuba is not a major power, but it is a key figure in anti-American circles in the UN and elsewhere. Stabilized relations with the US would have a major impact on both the US and the international community.

Following that, the US should certainly stabilize its relations with Iran. Iran is an important element in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, and the current administration is more realistic in this regard than its predecessor.

The US should thus recognize that it is not omnipotent, and it should strategically improve relations with better countries while isolating the more extreme countries.

Now we come to Japan's role.

The greatest problem the world faces at present is China. While Russia may be acting aggressively, it does not have the power to recover the former territory of the Soviet Union. However, China continues pushing its territorial boundaries to their greatest extent ever by more flexible methods that verge on altering the status quo by force.

This expansion by China contravenes the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes.

First, Japan will not accept any change to the status quo in the East China Sea and, accordingly, it must upgrade its defensive capabilities. Legally, too, Japan must establish its individual and collective rights of defense as recommended in May 2014 by the Panel on the Reconstruction of the National Security Legal Foundation.

Secondly, Japan should always sound the alarm about actions in the South China Sea that violate the principle of the peaceful resolution of disputes, and should support

countries that observe this principle. The new Principles on the Export of Defense Equipment will no doubt prove useful in this regard.

Thirdly, Japan should more flexibly take on roles in PKOs worldwide, and in addition should at least provide logistical support for international military actions and other activities supported by the UN.

In dealing with Southeast Asia, including the region's authoritarian regimes, Japan has heretofore enjoyed success with its diplomatic approach of focusing first on stability, next on economic development, and then on democratization. As an extension of that, Japan should advocate an approach of more flexibly applying universal principles.

These are the implications of the active pacifism proposed by the Abe administration in 2013. Active pacifism is not a particularly new policy. Unlike the passive pacifism of seeking as far as possible to avoid being caught up in conflicts that has been so prevalent among the public, active pacifism only seeks to become actively involved in, and to contribute to, efforts to realize peace. It should be noted that active pacifism is inherently limited to efforts undertaken within the framework of international cooperation.

These are the responsibilities incumbent on Japan in the current era, and fulfilling these responsibilities is quite feasible.

Valerie Niquet

What is at stake today in the Asia-Pacific, 70 years after the end of the Second World War and 25 years after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war is, not only strategic stability and territorial issues, but also the defence and support of an international order based on democratic values. These values comprise respect for the rule of law, transparency, particularly concerning defence policy, military budget, financial institutions or ODA attribution policy, but also the denunciation of the use of force or threat to use force to solve territorial or other issues and of course the respect for global commons and freedom of navigation. In that respect, the evolution of the situation in the Asia-Pacific is of global interest, including for the European Union and its member States.

These democratic values constitute the core of the liberal international order and are more broadly accepted as universal norms, including in the Asia Pacific. The Philippines, for instance, decided to present its case concerning the South China Sea dispute with the PRC to the international court of law. Vietnam, albeit a different political regime, did not but has demonstrated its interest in the procedure. Asean, a leading player in the region favours the signature of a code of conduct in the South China sea based on these values in spite of the attachment of its member States, to the principles of non interference and sovereignty.

However, in spite of these positive evolutions, one cannot but recognize the growing divide emerging in Asia between on one side a “fragile superpower”¹, the PRC, and on the other side almost all the other actors in the region who do accept the principal of international norms.

In that context, Japan plays a major role in implementing these norms as the favoured way to answer challenges to stability in the Asia Pacific region. One reason is a historical reason: Japan, and the Japanese people paid dearly for having forgotten the value of these norms and, just like Germany in Europe, it gradually became after the war a champion of a peaceful liberal international order. Since the 2000s, Japan has been trying to translate this position into a more proactive role as a normal, legitimate, normative power.

For the European Union and its member States, the respect and defence of these

¹ Susan Shirk, *China Fragile Superpower*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

norms is “a fundamental element of our Foreign policy”.² Of course, the Asia-Pacific region is geographically far away and this sometimes makes it more difficult for decision makers in Europe to recognize the urgency and challenges to strategic stability and the liberal order in the region.

However, this region is of tremendous importance to us and to the global order both in economic and strategic terms. It is also a region where challenges and tensions are on the rise, involving leading economic and trade powers. A region crossed by the most important sea lanes of communications, of interest to countries far beyond the region itself; and a region where the respect and implementation of a transparent system of norms in dealing with these challenges is of tremendous importance to the stability of the world.

Since the end of the second world war, Japan has been playing an increasing and today a major role to propose and implement mutually recognized and transparent norms in trade, investment, respect of intellectual property rights, the environment or – of the utmost importance today – the best way to deal in a prudent, transparent but assured manner with maritime and territorial tensions.

The position of Japan in the region however, and the more proactive role Tokyo could play, including in terms of norms prescription, has been challenged by a tensed strategic situation whose main characteristic is the emergence of a more assertive Chinese regime, focused on the realization of the “China dream” extended to the whole of Asia as a way to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, and a growing ideological divide in spite of more than 30 years of reform and opening policy in the PRC.

Moreover, the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific is also characterized, contrary to what emerged in Europe after the Second World War, by a lack of institutions, which could “integrate” Japan in a broader community of common interests, common values and common identity like the European Union did with Germany during and after the cold war.

The situation in the Asia Pacific is very different. In spite of its free riding economic policy inside the framework of the WTO, China is still a Leninist regime. It did not achieve – yet – its political transition and ideologically, in spite of its successes, the regime is increasingly insecure. In order to survive, its main objective in terms of security policy, it relies on an increasingly nationalist narrative and a more assertive position concerning the defence of its “rights”, particularly its “maritime rights” leading

² Christian Lechery, « The Role of Diplomacy in Promoting Norms in the Asia-Pacific », keynote speech, *The Asian Century, What International Norms and Practices*, IFRI Conference, 12-09-2014.

to growing tensions with its neighbours. This is the main reason why, paradoxically, relations between the PRC and Japan today are far more tensed than during the cold war, when Beijing needed the support of Japan against a perceived Soviet threat and also as a source of funding for its economic development.

In that context, the system of liberal international order to deal with territorial and strategic issues in the region is denounced by the Chinese regime as a threat to its own “sovereignty” and “core interests”.

In other fields also, whereas Japan is playing an important and leading role as a normative power like transparency of the military budget, the environment, climate change issues, financial institutions or development aid, the PRC adopts a posture of unilateralism and opacity. More recently, Beijing has been trying to challenge more concretely to challenge the concept of democratic institutions based on universal norms. The most recent example has been the proposal by Xi Jinping in 2013 to establish the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a direct challenge to the Asian Development Bank (AIB) where Japan, and the values it promotes, plays a leading role.

The PRC has the ambition to impose a strongly hierarchical regional order, referring to a “pre modern” set of norms and concepts, like the concept of “harmony” or “*tian xia* 天下” and a glorified promotion of the former tributary system. In order to achieve this objective, the PRC needs to maintain Japan’s status as an “enemy”, with no legitimacy on the international scene and no right to build its own narrative on historical issues.³ In a strangely twisted argument, the increased and more proactive role played by Japan on the regional and global scene is this denounced by the PRC as a “reversal” of the post second world war order.

To counter the re-emergence of Japan – a successful and dynamic democracy whose attractive power remains high in spite of economic stagnation – a “normal” and a legitimate normative power on the international scene, China needs to build a counter-narrative to delegitimise Japan’s new role. Japan’s more proactive role in security matters, globally welcomed by its neighbours, is denounced by Beijing and its propaganda warfare apparatus as neo-militarism. Tokyo is accused of trying to “topple the world order issued from the second world war” and, as an ally of the United States whose rebalancing policy China tries to counter, of supporting the “old obsolete alliances system inherited from the cold war”.

At the same time, the PRC constantly builds new cases in order to nurture this

³ By « own narrative » I do not mean a revisionist approach to historical issues but rather the possibility for Japanese researchers – and Chinese researchers - to present analysis not in strict conformity with the CCP’s official historical position. As long as this will not be the case, no significant progress will be accomplished in the establishment of bilateral commissions on history concerning the colonial period and the war.

narrative. Today, this is the territorial issue around the Senkaku and the East China Sea. In 2005, when Japan announced its will to bid for a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations, a direct challenge to the PRC's pre-eminence as an Asian nation in this institution, it was the issue of Japanese text books. Regularly, the issue visits or possible visits of Japanese officials to the Yasukuni shrine is also raised.

One understands the necessity for Japan, just as for any other former colonial power, to work on its past history, in order to build better trust with its former colonies or occupied territories, the best way to be fully accepted as a legitimate power in the region and to diffuse the PRC's strategy of delegitimisation. However, Japan's partners, particularly in Europe less immediately involved in the strategic tensions in the region, must also recognize that "History" and "historical issues" are essentially used as an instrument of control and domination by the Chinese regime, and not as an element of dialogue and trust building.

On this issue, however, European countries should be best placed to understand the situation between Japan and the PRC but also between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The example of France-Germany, often cited, particularly in the PRTC, is not the best one. But rather the example of the reconciliation between Russia and Germany, which could happen only after the political transition in the Soviet Union – whatever imperfect – and the fall of a regime whose legitimacy – just like in the PRC today – was based on the constant reference to the "great patriotic war against fascism". Another pertinent example is the still difficult relations between France and its former colonies, particularly with Algeria in spite of the fact that, in recent years, France has been stressing the necessity to "repent" in its own historical narrative and history textbooks.

All these elements are important challenges that Japan has to face to be accepted as a normal power in its own region. In spite of these challenges, Japan's status as a legitimate normative power is more broadly accepted today as at any time in its history, including in its own region, with the exception of course of the PRC and – for different reasons and less significant consequences – the Korean peninsula.

One can find two major reasons to this evolution. On the one hand, thanks to the democratization momentum in Asia since the end of the 1980s, Japan, as a democracy, is less an "alien" exception: Japan can be both democratic AND fully part of Asia. On the other hand, the more aggressive foreign strategy followed by the Chinese regime since 2008 is the source of growing uneasiness in Asia, and led to an embryo and informal coalition of countries embracing the same norms, particularly in international behaviour. Moreover, this community of values extend far beyond the region and could also contribute to the legitimacy of Japan as a normative power on the global scene.

Facing both difficult challenges and new opportunities 70 years after the end of the Second World War, Japan can play an important and normative role both at the regional and global level.

Edward Schwarck

Effective policy typically achieves balance between three elements: design, implementation and presentation. A sound policy must be designed well, implemented effectively, and sold convincingly to the public. The Obama administration's Pivot to Asia, for example, has been accused of being correct in its design but as having failed in its implementation and presentation. In shaping a more activist foreign policy for Japan, the Abe administration is arguably successful in the first two elements, but not the third. Indeed, Japan's inability to shape the public narrative about its foreign policy initiatives is arguably one of Japan's greatest foreign policy weaknesses. Tokyo's mixed messaging about its war legacy in particular has left it open to attacks in the media from China, which is proving adept at taking control of the public discussion surrounding Japan's foreign policy.

Design and Implementation

In terms of policy design, Japan is focussed on strengthening defence and security relationships with new partners in Europe, Australia and India. These relationships feed a highly outward facing policy called the 'Pro-active Contribution to Peace.' The policy's aim of steering Japan away from its post-war pacifist defence posture is part of the country's 'normalisation': the process by which Japan begins to contribute more to international peace and stability rather than take a backseat to its partners.

The implementation is exemplified by deployments to Iraq, logistical support to NATO operations in Afghanistan, and contributions to anti-piracy in the Western Indian Ocean. The U.S. and many countries in Europe are strongly supportive of Japan's position on this point.

Presentation

Yet Abe's approach to the third item – presentation of policy – is a mixed bag.

On one hand, Japan explains its re-emergence as a military power by the growing threat the country faces from an array of state and non-state actors. Concurrently, Tokyo is seeking to shape a new narrative of Japan as an upholder of international norms and 'global rules-based order'. Anti-piracy missions, for example, were conducted under the banner of ensuring the global 'freedom of navigation' – a decidedly internationalist security objective befitting Japan's profile as a 'status-quo' power.

Japan's efforts in this regard are driven by the correct assumption that 'soft power'

– the ability to affect outcomes through persuasion or attraction, as opposed to armed force – partially rests on communicating compelling narratives. Put simply, the story that a country tells about itself affects how other countries interpret its actions.

In shaping such a narrative, Japan presents its Proactive Contribution to Peace as an innocuous evolution of the country's post-war pacifist stance. In doing so, the Abe administration hopes to draw international support for its defence reforms, as well as for the threat the country faces from China. The ultimate goal is to embed Japan within a network of 'like-minded' countries that will understand and support Japan if the atmosphere in the Asia-Pacific becomes even more fractious.

Yet to the frustration of many in Japan (and sympathetic observers outside), the country's war history continues to affect the narrative surrounding its diplomatic initiatives. Indeed, Tokyo seems unable to prevent the war legacy issue from infecting its contemporary foreign policy. The problem persists despite an immensely well-resourced public diplomacy drive.

Communicating Smartly

In assessing the UK's performance in projecting soft power, a House of Lords committee recently commented that 'Just the act of projecting a narrative can be viewed as coercion or manipulation.' 'Mutuality' in how a country presents its narrative is therefore crucial. Soft power, the committee concluded, should not simply be about 'showcasing the UK's assets' but sharing those assets and supporting a reciprocal exchange of ideas and culture.'

This message is equally applicable to Japan: Tokyo cannot ultimately control how other countries interpret its communications. Messages intended and messages received are usually not the same. Japan must be prepared to discuss the problematic sides of its war legacy – and do so in a fashion that serves its foreign policy objectives.

The importance of this debate is intensifying alongside increasing global inter-connectivity. The conduct of international relations is moving beyond mere government-to-government diplomacy. The rise of mass and social media has increased the importance of public opinion in diplomacy, but also facilitated a state's ability to shape that opinion. As Joseph Nye argues, international relations 'is not just whose army wins, it is also whose story wins in an information age.'

In this area, Japan's would-be adversary – China – has the edge. While Beijing's authoritarian vision is unappealing to most, it is adept at shaping the public discussion about the actions of other countries.

This is partially a product of China's power. It is much easier to exert 'soft'

influence if one is well resourced economically and militarily. But it is more than that. Chinese political and military thinking has shows a strong awareness of the power of information. PLA writings contain a growing body of work on ‘political warfare’ and the psychological elements of strategy.

Beijing’s approach in its contest with Japan over sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands has therefore centred on a high volume media assault.

The potency of this assault does not lie in the credibility of Beijing’s accusations of Japan’s return to ‘militarism’ (although these may sometimes be taken seriously in other Asian capitals), but rather the extent to which they distract attention among third party audiences from China’s own behaviour.

This matters less in Washington, where the U.S. commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, despite widespread anguish when Japan’s history hits the headlines. However, China’s verbal diatribes cause particular discomfort in Europe, where willingness to engage Japan as a partner or ally is tempered by lingering suspicion over its unpredictability. For many European countries, keeping silent when verbal sparks fly between China and Japan is more appealing than supporting a like-minded partner in Tokyo that may nevertheless drag them into conflict.

Policy Options

Resolution to the war question in Japan will probably involve a public discussion that takes decades. In the meantime, however, Japan can help build a more effective narrative through an all-of-government approach. Branches of Japan’s civil service must be walking in lock step on the messages they deliver to the public. This applies not only to the civil service, but to politicians and the leadership as well. A long-term and unified strategic narrative about Japan’s foreign policy – promulgated from the very centre of government – is vital in generating positive views about Japan’s conduct abroad.

Currently, Japan’s difficulty in controlling discussion about its own trajectory means that while it is succeeding in most of its foreign policy, it is allowing its adversaries to take control of the public debate. This is damaging Japan’s ability to present its naturally attractive values and welcome contribution to international security.

Rizal Sukma

The existing international order, often described as a liberal one, has been around for seven decades. It has brought about a relative global stability (the absence of great power war) and fostered economic prosperity in many parts of the world. The liberal international order promotes greater economic exchanges between states by encouraging low barrier to trades and investments, and by creating greater integration of nations through globalisation. It operates through a set of rules and institutions. It was, and still is, sustained largely by democratic states. And one source of that stability and prosperity has been the global leadership provided by the United States (US).

Within East Asia, especially after the end of the Cold War, US leadership was acknowledged as a stabilizing factor, making it possible for the region to enjoy an unprecedented period of stability and a high degree of economic growth. While the US' role and leadership in East Asia was often described as a hegemonic one, it was accepted by and large as a benign one. The question now is, will the rise of China threaten or undermine that liberal international order?

The growth China's power and role, and its implications for the future international order, has become an important subject of discussion and debate among both academics and policy makers. One central question has been whether China would seek to replace the existing order with one that is based on its own values, and interests. There is no simple and easy answer to this question. However, one can assume that China would want to play a role commensurate with its new status as a great power. At the same time, there are also reasons for the US to recognize that it can no longer play a hegemonic leadership role in a way that it used to.

China has benefited a lot from the liberal international order. Spectacular progress in China's economic development would not have been possible if not for the support from, and cooperation with, key members of the liberal international order, especially the US and Japan. China also benefitted from liberal institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This reality, some argued, would not give China any incentive to undo the very system from which it had prospered. However, as Kagan has argued, the problem is not whether China would want to replace the liberal order but whether it could sustain it even if it wanted to do so.¹ In other words, in the case of an American decline, China might not have sufficient capacity to preserve the existing liberal order.

¹ Robert Kagan, *The World America Made* (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), pp. 75-83.

However, as China's power grows, it is difficult also to imagine that China would not want introduce any change to the existing international order based on rules of which it did not have any role in writing. Recent China's initiatives, such as the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and assertive behaviour in the South China Sea, seem to reflect China's desire to shape the emerging global order. Similarly important question is, can China lead? China understands that with a global leadership role will come also the responsibility and obligations to provide for regional and global public goods. And, China is not yet prepared, nor capable, of taking such a role and providing the required responsibility and obligation.

The same can also be said regarding China's intent, if any, to dominate. China is powerful, but it is not the only powerful state in the neighbourhood, and it will not become the only powerful state. It is a big elephant in a room full of elephants. The US, India, and Japan are still great power players in this region. Any attempt by China to establish a Chinese-dominated order will certainly meet with strong resistance from these powers. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how other regional middle and smaller powers – Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, and ASEAN countries – could accept a *pax-sinica* to be established in its neighbourhood. In other words, a Chinese-dominated order would only be possible after the unlikely collapse of Japan, India, and the US.

Therefore, one can argue that the liberal international order needs to be refined, not replaced. That refinement would require a collective effort involving all countries that have a stake in it, including China. Japan can take a leading role in that process by taking the following measures:

- 1) It is imperative for all nations to keep reminding both China and the US that the future of international order depends on cooperative relationship between the two. Strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington would surely jeopardise the future of liberal international order.
- 2) It is also necessary for Japan and China to find solution to the current problems in their bilateral relations. The imperative of creating a rules-based regional order in East Asia depends to a large extent on the evolving relationship between the two powers.
- 3) Japan needs to facilitate China's integration into the existing international order. For example, the AIIB should be seen as an integral part of the existing international financial architecture, together with the WB, IMF, and the ADB. Japan should consider joining, and persuading the US not to oppose, the AIIB.

- 4) The liberal international order is basically anchored in the liberal democracy tradition. Thus, Japan should step up its role in supporting the basic values of the international liberal order: open market, democracy, human rights, and transparency.
- 5) Japan's support to ASEAN countries, especially in realising the 2015 ASEAN Community and beyond, is crucial for fulfilling the Association's intention to preserve its strategic autonomy and centrality as a pre-requisite for keeping the region turning into a site for great power politics.

Choi Wooseon*

Strategic Situation in East Asia

The main driving force behind the changes of the strategic situation in East Asia is the rise of China and the changing balance of power. With its rapidly growing economic capabilities, China has accelerated its military modernization since late 1990s. In recent years, China's growing A2/AD capabilities and assertive behaviors caused the United States to step up its balancing of China in the name of rebalancing. Thus, as the result of the changing balance of power, the competition between the United States and China has been increasing.

The East Asian system, however, is still stable mainly due to the powerful stabilizing role of the United States. The United States has kept its engagement in Asia after the Cold War. And the United States has tried to keep status quo by reducing the Chinese incentives for military buildup through engagement while maximizing its military advantages as a hedge against the future uncertainty. Other side of its Asian policy is reassurance of Japan. The United State has induced Japan to pursue a restrained policy by keeping its military presence in Asia and maintaining its commitment to Japan's security. Through this Asian policy, the United States could maintain regional stability and its leadership.

Under U.S. superiority, China has pursued accommodation with the United States while avoiding direct military challenge. Through its combined policy of engagement and balancing, the United States has maintained its mainly cooperative relationship with China despite their growing competition. Certainly, economic interdependence contributes to this relationship. More importantly, however, this cooperation between the United States and China is rooted in their common interests in the maintenance of status quo.

Although China is rapidly rising, its power should not be exaggerated. The overestimation of the extent of China's rise can cause either overreaction or appeasement tendency. The United State has greater economic capability, especially in terms of quality. It is maintaining overwhelming military superiority, globally and regionally, despite the Chinese efforts. For a quite long time, the United States will keep its superior position and maintain the stability in Asia. In the long run, China might possibly challenge the United State in Asia. And security competition in the region will probably become intense. Even then, it would be very difficult for China to become a dominant power in Asia because most other states, including India, Japan, Russia, and

Korea, will likely make collective balancing against China to maintain the balance of power.

Japan's Expected Course of Action

Japan has pursued a more active foreign policy in recent years while making greater efforts to strengthen its military capabilities. This policy change has been mainly motivated by the rise of China. The greater role and power of Japan will make positive effects on the maintenance of the balance of power in Asia in the long run. Considering the regional rivalry and historical sensitivities, however, Japan needs to pursue a more active role and increase its military capabilities while restraining itself within the framework of U.S.-Japan alliance and defensive posture in order to maintain regional stability.

Actually, considering the international and domestic conditions, Japan will be in a defensive position. The gap between Japan and China will probably be widened in the future. Consequently, it will not be possible for Japan to maintain the balance with China without American ally. The fiscal and normative constraints within Japan will also limit the extent of its mobilization capacity. Thus, for its security and regional stability, it would be imperative for Japan to maintain its alliance with the United States.

In this regard, in steering Japan to a new proactive foreign policy, Abe government has attempted to mobilize political support in order to overcome institutional and political constraints. However, it should avoid the danger of practicing too much mobilization politics. Especially, if it is combined with nationalism, it will sacrifice the relationship with important partner states while hardening the political landscape, and even raising the possibility of being entrapped in hyper-nationalism. They will reduce Japan's diplomatic flexibility over time. In practice, Japan will be able to play a more active role in international community without resorting to nationalistic mobilization politics.

Japan needs to pursue a more balanced China policy combining engagement and hedging in the existing condition. Appropriate preparations for future uncertainties should be made before it is too late. However, the extent of China's rise should not be exaggerated. It is important to keep regional stability while hedging against future uncertainties. Recently, Japan has tried to establish a *modus vivendi* with China despite the territorial disputes. It is a desirable course of action.

Japan should improve its relationship with Korea. Both countries share important strategic interests. Thus it is very important for Korea and Japan to lay the firm ground for strategic cooperation. Nonetheless, historical issues have seriously hindered the

development of the relationship between the two countries. Especially, the comfort women issue remains a serious humanitarian issue. If the issue is not solved, it will not be possible for Korea and Japan to really reconcile with each other under the present circumstances. Japan should not stagnate its relationship with the important partner state under the weight of history. Japan needs to take a forward-looking position in settling historical issues for serious future cooperation rather than using them for political mobilization.

Japan also should continue its cooperation with other concerned parties to solve the North Korea nuclear issue and to keep the nonproliferation regime. It is important for all concerned parties to keep close coordination in order to induce North Korea to make a strategic decision. International community should strengthen its cooperation for sanctions on North Korea to increase the costs of its bad behaviors. On the other hand, through close coordination, the concerned parties should come up with a bold and comprehensive action plan that can clearly show the incentives for denuclearization to North Korea. Japan as a country committed to non-proliferation can play an active role for solving North Korea nuclear issue.

Lastly, territorial disputes and China's growing power projection capabilities are increasing the chance of accidental military conflicts in the air and sea. It is necessary to develop a multilateral crisis management system in Northeast Asia to prevent the conflicts and escalation. More broadly, those multilateral efforts should be combined with the long-term efforts for military confidence building. By actively participating in these multilateral efforts, Japan will be able to contribute to the development of multilateral security institution and peace in the region.

*The views expressed here are those of author and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization with which he is affiliated.

William Choong

The Asia-Pacific security landscape in 2015 is driven by a milieu of different challenges: territorial disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, the growing assertiveness of China, pressing concerns about the sustainability of the American “rebalance” or pivot to the Asia-Pacific, as well as newer challenges such as the rise of the Islamic State in the Levant, and how that would affect the societal stability and security of Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia. Amid this milieu of challenges, Japan has a major role to play – an aspiration summed up well by Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in his formulation of Japan’s “proactive contribution to peace.”¹ This article details the extant challenges faced by countries in the Asia-Pacific, and draws up a list of instances in which Tokyo can play role in ensuring regional stability.

One of the most potent challenges posed to regional security is China’s execution of “salami slicing” tactics – a divide-and-conquer strategy that seeks to undermine, slice by slice, the claims made by Japan and several Asean countries on disputed islands in the East China Sea and South China Sea respectively. Through their incursions into the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, China seeks to change the facts on the ground. In September 2012, for example, four vessels from the Chinese State Oceanic Administration sought to chase Japanese ships out of the waters surrounding the disputed islands.² In the South China Sea, China has continued to build major structures on islands in the Spratlys chain.³ While China’s growing military and diplomatic prowess has been the focus in media and scholarly circles, one often-neglected dynamic behind Chinese assertiveness are references to the need to reclaim the country’s honour following the “century of humiliation” effected by foreign powers in the century ended 1945. Chinese references to the reclamation of honor and fear is a concept that looms large in official discourse, with the Beijing’s nine-dashed line claim to the South China Sea being the practical example of China’s need to reclaim its lost honour.

Another dynamic that poses a challenge to regional security is the strategic competition between China and the United States in the Asia-Pacific. In recent months, China has effected what could be seen to be a challenge to the United States’ so-called

¹ Remarks by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Australian Parliament, 8 July 2014, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0708article1.html

² William Choong, *The Ties that Divide: History, Honour and Territory in Sino-Japanese Relations*, Adelphi 445, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, p 75

³ Robert Beckman, “China’s Reclamation Work in S. China Sea Raises Issues,” *The Straits Times*, 31 October 2014, Joel Guinto, “China Building Dubai-Style Fake Islands in South China Sea,” *Bloomberg*, 11 June 2014

“rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific. For every US- or Western-led multilateral institution that Washington has built, China has come up with a modern equivalent. For example, China is part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, seen to be a rival to the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Xiangshan Forum, now upgraded to a full ministerial defence forum, is seen as an analogue to the Shangri-La Dialogue (which is seen by many Chinese officials as a proxy for US influence in the region). The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, established by China with \$50 billion in funds, is seen as a rival to the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, which are traditionally led by Japan and the U.S. respectively.

Expectations for Japan

Regional expectations of Japan amid such challenges to regional security centre on Tokyo’s contributions to stability through the establishment of rule of law, Japan’s own defence reforms and the offer of assistance to regional states to build their capacity for maintaining maritime security.

Since his return to the premiership in December 2012, Mr Abe has sought to bolster Japan’s regional security role. For example, he has established a US-style National Security Council, passed a secrecy law and sought to reinterpret Article 9 of the country’s pacifist Constitution that would enable Japan to practise collective self-defence. While some critics in China and South Korea have criticised Mr Abe’s administration for shifting to the right, such concerns are unwarranted. A landmark Cabinet paper released on July 1, 2014, imposed restrictive conditions on the practice of collective self-defence: (a) when there is a “clear danger” to the Japanese people’s “life, liberty and happiness”; (b) when there are no other appropriate means to repel an attack on Japan and (c) when the use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary.⁴ The cabinet document looks set to inform revisions to the US–Japan alliance guidelines originally expected at the end of 2014 – the first revision since 1997. In an interim report published in October 2014, Tokyo and Washington said that the revised guidelines will detail cooperation between the two governments in situations involving “an armed attack against Japan, and in case of an armed attack against a country in close relationship with Japan where Japan’s use of force is permitted under its Constitution and in accordance with the Cabinet decision of July 1, 2014.” In itself, this would augur

⁴ Prime Minister and His Cabinet, ‘Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People’, 1 July 2014, pp 7-8, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/decisions/2014/_icsFiles/afieldfile/2014/07/03/anpohosei_eng.pdf

well for regional security.⁵

Japan has, and should, also play a role in regional security in its relationships with various ASEAN states. Japan's role in assisting in the economic development of the region is undisputed. In the past decade, the value of Japanese exports has jumped 2.3 times, while ASEAN exports to Japan have risen 2.5 times.⁶ Japan has also played a role in building up the coast guard capacity of countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, through the sale or transfer of vessels for coastal patrols.

Japan's push for the adherence to the rule of law is beneficial to regional security – given China's push to bolster its claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea through the deployment of white hulls (i.e. coast guard ships) and the reclamation of islands in the Spratlys. Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014, Mr Abe laid out three principles for the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific – that countries should clarify their territorial claims based on international law, refrain from the use of force or coercion and settle disputes through peaceful means.⁷ While many would find it hard to debate with such principles, the key challenge remains: how to get China and other countries to stop the building of structures on islands in the South China Sea. Such would not help bolster their claims to the islands under international law, but nonetheless would represent a changing of facts on the ground (or at sea). As it stands, other countries besides China, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, have conducted land reclamation on the South China Sea islands that they control. Vietnam, for example, has substantially altered Southwest Cay after capturing it from the Philippines in 1975. It has added a harbour and other features in the past 10 years.⁸ Speaking at a lecture in June 2014, Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam said that the action of “a number of parties” in the South China Sea were not in “strict conformity to international law.” While everyone should obey international law, such a desire sounded more like an “expression of hope.”⁹

Finally, Japan should consider crafting a historic apology to China and South Korea, particularly in a year when the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II would be

⁵ Embassy of the United States (Tokyo), ‘Interim Report on the Revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation’, 8 October 2014, <http://aboutusa.japan.usembassy.gov/pdfs/wwwf-20141008-usj-defense-cooperation.pdf>

⁶ Address by Shinzo Abe, “Japan and Asean, Always in Tandem: Towards a More Advantageous Win-Win Relationship through My “Three Arrows”, 33rd Singapore Lecture, July 26, 2013, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/25/pdfs/pm_ja_130726_en.pdf

⁷ Shinzo Abe, Shangri-La Dialogue 2014 Keynote Address, 30 May 2014, <http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-b0b2/keynote-address-shinzo-abe-a787>

⁸ James Hardy, Krispen Atkinson, Richard Hurley and Michael Cohen, “China Goes All Out With Major Island Building Project in Spratlys,” IHS Janes’ 360, 20 June 2014, <http://www.janes.com/article/39716/china-goes-all-out-with-major-island-building-project-in-spratlys>

⁹ IISS-Fullerton Lecture, A Conversation with Mr K. Shanmugam, 30 June 2014, <http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2014-0f13/june-d70b/fullerton-lecture-shanmugam-0829>

commemorated. It has been reported that Mr Abe would essentially use the terms “colonial aggression” and “tremendous damage” caused by Japan – words used by his predecessors Tomiichi Murayama and Junichiro Koizumi at the 50th and 60th anniversaries respectively.

This might not suffice. Some Chinese analysts note that the key phrase used in the two statements – *qianyi* – is not a strong apology as *xiezui* (“to apologise for an offence”). To their credit, they are not expecting a Willy Brandt. In 1970, the German leader fell to his knees at a former Warsaw ghetto and apologised for what the Nazis had done.

But an apology with a sense of time and place matters. In October 2001, Mr Koizumi earned kudos in China when he made a silent tribute at the Memorial Museum of Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War and pledged that Japan would learn from its part. The memorial is located near the Marco Polo Bridge, where Japanese and Chinese Nationalist forces squared off in 1937.

Such expectations of Japan to make amends for history are not confined to China and South Korea – two countries which have suffered at the hands of Japan during the war. In June 2014, Singapore premier Lee Hsien Loong said that there would be a “continuing sore” in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea if the comfort women issue, Japan’s wartime aggression and other wartime-related problems are not resolved.¹⁰ More recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called on Japan to face its wartime squarely. While reconciliation in Europe after the war would not have been possible without the “big gestures” by Germany’s neighbours, there was acceptance in Germany to “call things by their name”.¹¹

¹⁰ Japan Times, “Singapore PM urges Japan to ‘Act Cautiously’ on History,” *Japan Times*, 25 June 2014, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/06/25/national/politics-diplomacy/singapore-pm-urges-japan-to-act-cautiously-on-history/#.VQqhv47LfYg>

¹¹ Andreas Rinke, “Visiting Merkel Reminds Japan to Face Wartime Past,” *Reuters*, 9 March 2015

Michael Fullilove

Both Australia and Japan are confronting a changing security environment.

For most of Australia's history, the world was run by countries like our own. When the world map was painted pink, we were a member of the British empire. Throughout the Pax Americana, Australia has been a treaty ally of the United States.

The order that has prevailed since the Second World War has served Australia's interests. But now two things are happening. Our great and powerful friends are becoming, in relative terms, less great and powerful. And wealth and power are moving eastwards, towards us.

If the economic outlook in Asia is positive, however, the security outlook is unpredictable. China's rise, and the unevenness of Chinese behaviour, are contributing to this uncertainty.

In Australia, our views towards China are bifurcated. The 2014 Lowy Institute poll revealed Australians view Japan and China almost equally as Australia's best friends in Asia, but at the same time almost half of the population (48%) believe it is likely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next twenty years. It is disconcerting when your leading trading partner is a competitor of your great strategic partner.

China is rising, other regional states are reacting, and economic growth is magnifying interstate competition. A number of regional powers, including Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia and Vietnam, are jostling for advantage. There are worrying tensions and potential flashpoints on the Korean peninsula and in the East and South China Seas

And there are question marks about the United States' role in the region. Its presence is critical to stability in the region, but the challenge posed by China is unlike anything the United States has faced before. There are worrying signs about Americans' readiness for the contest. The pivot has been heavily advertised but so far it is not impressive.

Politically, President Obama has been distracted. Secretary Kerry is rarely sighted in the region. Some of the main proponents of the pivot have left government. Militarily the pivot is underwhelming, even if all the initiatives proceed. Diplomatically, the change is negligible. On the economics, let's see what happens with the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

It is remarkably difficult to pivot a country as large and diverse as the United States.

Australians hope the United States recovers its confidence and reaffirms its Pacific presence. We hope China's foreign-policy behaviour becomes more measured and predictable. But what if there is conflict? Even more alarming, what if America retreats while China advances? Nation-states must follow Disraeli's lead, hoping for the best but preparing for the worst.

For many years, Australians complained about the tyranny of distance. Now the tyranny of distance has been replaced by the predicament of proximity. We are closer to the world's booming markets – and closer to the world's developing crises. We are less isolated – and less insulated. The same is true for Japan.

Australia and Japan are both facing unprecedented changes that will test us and to succeed we need to take a larger approach to the world.

For Australia, that means we need to be a larger country. The single biggest contributor to a nation's power and influence is its economy, which pays for our diplomatic and military capacities. Both our economy and our strategic weight would benefit from a larger population. And we need a bigger tool chest, including an extensive diplomatic network and a capable military. We also need a larger foreign policy – one that combines ambition and coherence. Ambition is about imagination; coherence is about execution. We also need more coherent politics.

Japan, too, is getting larger. Japan's push to modernise its defence forces, strengthen its national security apparatus, and reinterpret its constitution to allow for broader collective self-defence is an important contribution to shouldering more of the burden for security in the Asia Pacific.

But as we get larger we both also need to calm the concerns of our neighbours. They need to understand – through our measured language – that we are not on the offensive. I would urge Japanese friends to show honesty and remorse for the Second World War, as well as pride in Japan's achievements since then.

As well as being larger, we need to strengthen the bilateral relationship between Australia and Japan, as well as with the US. Imagined as a triangle, two sides are strong – the US-Japan and US-Australia relationships – but thickening Australia-Japan security cooperation will help reinforce stability in the Asia Pacific.

Building from the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007 our countries' militaries now regularly train with each other, and trilaterally with the US. We have agreed to share intelligence and cooperate on defence technology, and we have signed agreements enabling the provision of services and supplies between our militaries. We have also cooperated on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

All of this improves our interoperability, and strengthens our joint ability to

respond to security challenges in the Asia Pacific. We should continue and build upon this cooperation.

But our relationship needs to be broad-based. It is led from the top by prime ministers Abe and Abbott, but of course our mutual interests and natural alignment are deeper than these individuals.

Japan and Australia are natural security partners not only because we are shared allies of the US, but also because we both have developed economies, we trade extensively and have done so for a half-century, and we have common liberal democratic values. Few nations in the region are as compatible on these measures as Japan and Australia. For Australia, our partnership with Japan is our closest and most mature in the region.

The warmth between the leaders of our nations is necessary but not sufficient. In fact, the relationship should not be over personalised. Politics can play havoc with important defence decisions – as we saw with Australia’s approach to procuring submarines.

Both Japan and Australia face a bracing strategic environment. And to meet it, we – and countries like us – need to get larger. In the face of uncertainty from our traditional allies, we need to do more as security providers. And we need to do more together to underwrite the international order that has enabled both our nations to prosper.

Hoang Anh Tuan

Looking at regional security challenges facing countries in the region over the past few years, one has tons of reasons for pessimism. These challenges include both traditional and nontraditional ones and I see three types of challenges are most predominant among them, being: (i) Regional security issues with global dimensions such as the on-and-off tension in the Korean Peninsular and the territorial disputes in Northeast and Southeast Asia.; (ii) the competition for power and influence among the major powers in the region; and (iii) the lack of effective and appropriate tools to manage these challenges.

Regional Security Issues:

Despite tireless efforts of countries and parties involved, situation in the Korean Peninsular is still tenuous, with threats and counter-threats by both opposing sides in the Peninsular to the use of force are hardly new to the region. Given the deep mistrust between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea and their heavily armed warring machines, tension between the two, if it may happen has always had far-reaching impacts on regional and global security, thus putting the entire region on high alert.

New tensions such as territorial disputes, both in the China's East Sea in Northeast Asia between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island and South China Sea, which originated in China's assertive behavior and its attempts to dominate and control these disputed islands and their surrounding areas are legitimate causes for concern. Given the high nationalist sentiment in all East Asian countries, being the Philippines, Japan, Vietnam and even China, and the fact that all claimants to the disputes are heavily armed, tensions in the region might easily lead to small and major conflicts, or even wars, with devastating effects ones have never seen before in the region in the past such as the Korean War of 1950-1953 or the Vietnam War of 1965-1975. If such scenario happens, not only global trade, of which 45% of its entire column passes through the sea lanes of communications is dependent on, but global prosperity and security are all affected.

Competition among Major Powers in the Region:

To make things more complicated, East Asia has now witnessed a new trend of pivoting to the region by all major powers from within and outside the region, without an exception, from the US, China, Japan, Russia, India and even the EU. These major

powers, seeing the economic potentials of the East Asian region and the linkage to their futures, have now begun to broaden and deepen their ties with the region. This has created growing tension and confrontation among major powers, thus pushing and pulling all regional countries. This, on the one hand, makes East Asia become more attractive, and, on the other, might crack national and regional unity with possibility of weakening and tearing the region into parts

Lack of Effective and Appropriate Tools:

It is a matter of fact that East Asia lacks an effective tool to manage these security challenges. Until recently, ASEAN has been seen as playing a central role in both institution building process and sets rules and regulations for regional engagements and interactions among countries in the region and between regional countries and their partners from outside. However this role is being challenged by China's and US growing assertiveness with their own initiative for institution buildings or playing greater and more active roles within the existing institutions. This has now created a kind of competition for influence between the ASEAN-centered institutions with those either led by the US or China, thus complicating the task of building a rule-based and ASEAN-led regional architecture.

So the questions to be asked: What then are the roles for Japan? What are the region's expectations of Japan? IS Japan prepared for a new "mission" ahead?

Generally speaking, the region's attitudes towards Japan have been changing dramatically since the end of the second World War. The views toward Japan are rather positive and Japan is now not seen as a warmonger or a militarized country. There are many factors have contributed to this, such as: (i) Japan's continuous and tireless efforts to pursue and implement the proactive peaceful diplomacy; (ii) Japan's active contribution to regional peace and security as demonstrated in Japan's sending its peace keeping forces to Cambodia after the signing of the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 and to Afghanistan and other countries in Africa; and (iii) Japan, in the views the region, is strictly constrained by its Constitution, the government's budget and the wills of political parties to use its armed forces for defense purposes only.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe, Japan has now been in the process of modernizing its armed forces and revising the constitutional constraints so that Japan could act more swiftly, both at home and abroad to better defend its national interests and to preserve peace and security in East Asia.

Given the changing nature of the region on the perceived threat the region is now

faced with, views in the region seem to be more and more supportive of Japan's move. Here are a few points the countries in Southeast Asia want to see Japan to act more quickly and more decisively. Those include:

Firstly, regional countries want to see the continuation of Japan's efforts to pursue its peaceful diplomacy.

Secondly, ASEAN members do want Japan to further strengthen and consolidate both ASEAN and the existing rules and institutions in the region.

Thirdly, we want Japan to make contributions as well as stronger efforts to bring about long-lasting peace and security in the region.

Different countries in the region may vary in their views toward Japan. However, it should be noted that during the past 70 years Japan has transformed itself from a warlike country into a country that is known for its peace-loving attitudes.

Matake Kamiya

The international community has been expressing expectations of Japan's "active pacifism," albeit with some reservations. What exactly does a more pro-active approach to pacifism entail? What exactly is Japan seeking to do?

Simply put, it suggests that Japan should in future more actively take on internationalist responsibilities, all the while rejecting military-centric approaches.

Two Types of Passivism Inherent in Postwar Pacifism

The fact that Japan must now discuss a more assertive pacifism stems from the two types of passivism that characterized Japan's postwar pacifism (this classification of Japan's postwar pacifism into the two categories described below is a perspective original to the author).

First, the idea of Japan acting outside its own territory to ensure its own peace was wholly absent from Japan's postwar pacifism.

Japanese in the immediate postwar years held that a peaceful nation was one that rejected militarism. Becoming a peaceful nation was understood as synonymous with never again misusing armed force to achieve national ambitions or to become a destroyer of peace. A consistent policy of relying on a minimal level of armed force for narrowly-defined self-defense was itself regarded as the reborn Japan's greatest contribution to world peace. Now that Japan has regained its national strength and become an economic superpower, however, the international community has at last come to demand that Japan go beyond its passive contribution of not becoming a destroyer of peace and take proactive steps around the world on behalf of peace.

Secondly, postwar Japan's pacifism lacked any recognition that military force has an essential role in building and maintaining peace and that the willingness to "employ" military force is at times required of states seeking peace.

Military power has a dual nature; if it is misused, it becomes a tool for wrecking peace. Despite that danger, however, international peace cannot be built and maintained without military power. How can such dangerous military force be used for the sake of peace? Ignoring this question makes it impossible to realize peace globally. Having experienced defeat and occupation in a reckless war and thus strongly distrustful of the effectiveness and legitimacy of military power as a means of national policy, Japanese in the postwar era had a strong tendency to regard peace and military action as diametrically opposed and to reject a role for military power in securing peace. For this

reason, Japan distanced itself as far as possible from the power politics of international relations, believing that its involvement in conflicts outside its own territory should be limited to the non-military realm. As Boston University Associate Professor Thomas Berger asserts, postwar Japan's pacifism was for the most part "anti-militarism." Japanese in the postwar period showed extreme wariness of all things military.

Practically speaking, though, peace and order cannot exist without an underpinning of force. In line with this common-sense premise, the international community is asking Japan, now an economic power, to incorporate the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces into its legitimate international activities for peace and to make contributions of the same quality, military and otherwise, as other countries.

Progress in Overcoming the First Passivism and Persistence of the Second Passivism

Japan can be justly proud of sticking to its decision throughout the postwar era not to seek to become a major military power even after becoming a major economic power. However, the new post-Cold War international environment has given rise to the idea that Japan's pacifism as a major power must be transformed in a way that overcomes this passivism. This is the essence of "active pacifism," which urges that Japan make more proactive contributions to international peace (1st activation) and restore the role of military power in securing peace (2nd activation).

Only the 1st activation can be said to have made any clear progress in the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War. This abruptly started with the Gulf Crisis that occurred immediately after the Cold War. Japan contributed the enormous sum of \$13 billion to resolving the crisis but made almost no contributions in terms of personnel, with the result being harsh international criticism that Japan had done nothing more than hand out some money. The shock of this reproach prompted Japan to seek out a more active role in ensuring world peace that included overseas dispatches of Self-Defense Forces ("international contributions").

The use of the SDF for the sake of international peace initially met with firm resistance among the Japanese people, who had a deep-seated concern that such a move might trigger alarm about Japan among the other countries of East Asia. However, the SDF's performance in Cambodia, East Timor and other countries around the world won high regard from the international community and local residents. As a result, support for dispatching the SDF overseas for UN PKOs and international humanitarian relief activities spread rapidly among the Japanese public.

The key point here, however, is that the shock of the Gulf War did not necessarily trigger a major change in the anti-military sentiment held by postwar Japanese. Following the Gulf War, the Japanese public more willingly consented to dispatch the SDF overseas to bolster Japan's "international contributions" and to engage in PKOs, disaster relief and other activities. At the same time, though, they compulsively sought to draw a sharp line in these activities between the use of military force and participation in combat.

The anti-military attitude of the Japanese has not gone completely unchanged during this time. The growing threat from North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as well as China's increasing assertiveness and provocative actions in the area around the Senkaku Islands have helped the Japanese people begin to understand that an excessively anti-military sentiment would put the country's safety at risk. The result has been a marked "normalization" of the Japanese public's views and ideas on security. The Japanese people have come quite far in accepting a role for military power in ensuring Japan's own safety.

Nevertheless, there has been no corresponding change in favor of recognizing a role for military power in pursuing international peace beyond Japan's territory. The Japanese populace still avoids confronting head-on a role for military power in securing peace abroad, with the result being their continuing insistence that the SDF's international peace activities be distanced considerably from "military activities."

Remarkable progress has thus been made in overcoming the 1st passivism of postwar pacifism during the 24 years of the post-Cold War era, but the 2nd passivism is still somewhat intact, with Japan's public unable to accept a larger role for military force for the sake of peace. If further progress is not made in reforming this view, the activation of Japan's postwar pacifism will remain incomplete.

The advocacy of active pacifism by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe should be understood as a commitment to resolve during his administration Japan's outstanding issue of achieving this 2nd activation of postwar pacifism.

Asia-Pacific Security and a Vision for Japan's Pacifism

Japan undoubtedly must activate its pacifism further if it is to play a larger role in the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

Broadly speaking, Japan is currently expected to undertake two types of efforts to maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

One is advancing cooperation with other countries in the region to more effectively address the many security issues the region faces. If Japan fails to modify even a little its stance of avoiding all actions relating to military activities, its effectiveness in cooperating with the other countries in the region will be constrained. This will also leave it unable to cooperate fully in capacity-building efforts in Southeast Asia.

The other is maintaining and reinforcing the free, open rule-based international order that presently exists in the region. This will require working with countries in the region to develop policies that ensure that no country in the region acts in selfish disregard of the rules. It has become particularly important for the sake of the region's future peace and security to ensure that an increasingly assertive China respects the existing order and abides by international rules. This will entail engaging (involving) China as much as possible, while at the same time hedging against and deterring selfish actions on China's part. To this end, it would serve Japan well to overcome not only the 1st passivism but also the 2nd passivism within its postwar pacifism and become more willing to employ military force for the sake of peace.

Richard Haass has pointed out that, although Japan has been a US partner throughout the postwar era, it has only been a "limited partner." From now on, Japan must seek to team up with the US and with other countries in the region as a "less limited partner."

Nearly a Half-Century of Advocacy for Active Pacifism

The idea of active pacifism, familiar to the rest of the world primarily through Prime Minister Abe, is by no means one original to him. The contention that Japan should take on more active internationalist responsibilities while steering clear of military-centrism gained traction within Japan's diplomatic and security community after the Cold War, especially after the Gulf Shock.

Indeed, recent research conducted by the author shows that this stance was already being advocated by leading intellectuals at the end of the 1960s, more than two decades before the Gulf War. Consider this passage:

Then, how will Japan's post-World War II pacifism be evaluated in relation to

problems in the 1970s? Phrases like 'not taking up arms,' 'anything but war,' 'not possessing nuclear weapons,' and 'not deploying troops overseas' characterize Japan's postwar pacifism. As these words demonstrate, Japan's postwar pacifism was a principle that denies something. To borrow an expression from Professor Kosaka Masataka, it was negative pacifism. However, to what extent will such negative and passive pacifism adapt itself to a greater international role in a time in the 1970s when Japan is about to play such a role?

Japan must continue its restraint in taking action of some kind. However, the theme for the country in the 1970s is to do something for Asia, instead of just retiring into its shell. If that is the case, there is a need to convert our pacifism from a negative and passive one to a more active and positive one.

I believe Japan must think of something independently and develop original schemes for approaching it in order to bear its international responsibilities more proactively while continuing to exclude military-centrism.

This passage was taken from a paper authored by Fuji Kamiya back in 1969. The need to activate Japan's pacifism was thus already being pointed out by leading intellectuals at the time Japan became self-aware that it had become an economic power. Nearly a half-century later, though, the passiveness of Japan's pacifism has yet to be overcome, and the author was astonished to discover that Japan's diplomatic and security experts still find themselves having to engage in discussions using almost the same words as their predecessors 45 years ago.

Absent the support of the Japanese people, concrete implementation of both Prime Minister Abe's active pacifism and acceptance of the limited exercise of the collective right to self-defense will prove extremely challenging and ultimately mere pie in the sky. Just how far will the Japanese populace accept the activation of pacifism? A number of public opinion polls conducted since the July 1, 2014 Cabinet decision consistently reveal strongly rooted opposition to acceptance of the limited exercise of the collective right to self-defense. As is often said, this is likely due in part to insufficient explanations by the Abe administration. More fundamentally, however, it would appear that the passiveness of postwar pacifism in not accepting a role for military power for the sake of peace stubbornly persists to this day.

Can the Japanese people at last overcome the passiveness that could not be overcome for 45 years? Can active pacifism be put into actual practice? If Japan is to

meet the expectations of the international community in playing a role in the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region and indeed of the entire globe, stagnation is no longer an option.

Henry Bensurto Jr.*

Peace and stability which are the bedrock of growth and prosperity in Asia are threatened by the expansive 9-dash line claim of China in the South China Sea (SCS) and the forcible imposition of such claim on the other smaller countries. China is unilaterally trying to change the status quo in the region.

International Reaction: Appeasement vs. Rule of Law

Faced with this threat, many countries have advocated for a rules-based resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippines in particular has brought the matter to third party adjudication by way of arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS.

However, the collective effort to peacefully resolve the disputes in the SCS within the framework of rule of law is diluted by the Appeasement-like (The New Appeasement) approach of others.

Appeasement, the policy of making concessions to an opposing power to avoid conflict, is most often identified with the foreign policy of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as he dealt with Hitler's Germany from 1937-1939¹.

Lesson from the Past

Appeasement did not work in the past². It will also not work now.

* The views expressed here by the author are his own personal views and does not in any way reflect that of the institution he is connected with.

¹ McDonough, Frank (2002), *Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement (Cambridge Perspectives in History)*, Cambridge University Press/ Smyth, Alice Mary, ed. (1941), *The Oxford Book of Quotations*, Oxford University Press. "Peace for our time" was a phrase spoken by Prime Minister Chamberlain on 30 September 1938 in his speech concerning the Munich Agreement after ceding Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. The lines read, "My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time."

² Driven by Adolf Hitler's ambitious expansionist agenda, Germany rebuilt its military despite the prohibitions of the Treaty of Versailles. From 1936 to 1938, Germany remilitarized Rhineland and 'united' with Austria. In September 1938, Hitler demanded that Sudetenland, a region in Czechoslovakia with a large ethnic German population, be handed over to Germany. Great Britain took the cudgels of negotiating with Germany. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938 to resolve the Sudetenland problem. Without discussing with the Czech, Chamberlain pledged to give Germany all areas of Sudetenland with a German population of more than 50 per cent. Hitler agreed, but later on increased his demands and asked for all of Sudetenland. The Munich Agreement was signed on 29 September 1938, which stated that Germany will receive Sudetenland but would leave the rest of the Czech Republic alone. The Munich agreement became the symbol of the policy of appeasement.

The mood at the time is often imputed for the choice of policy. Lingering memories of the First World War had left Europe war-weary. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was born of a desire to avoid armed conflict. He spoke of this in his famous statement broadcast on radio on 27 September 1938: "I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul; armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me... War is a fearful thing." Moreover, neither Britain nor France was ready for war military-wise. The economic hardship from the Great Depression, combined with a generally pacifist public sentiment, did not create a favorable environment for rearmament.

There are many theories from academicians as to why appeasement failed. Hans Morgenthau (1967), renowned scholar of political realism, regards appeasement as “a corrupted policy of compromise, made erroneous by mistaking a policy of imperialism for a policy of the status quo.”³ By offering Czechoslovakia, Britain and France expected to satisfy Hitler enough to settle for the status quo, when in reality Hitler would not settle for less than the world. Moreover, they believed Germany to act in good faith and keep its promises. It is apparent now that Germany had no interest in the status quo other than to break it.

For a nation with an expansionist agenda, small ‘sacrifices’—even offerings of small countries—are never enough. In Morgenthau’s (1967) words, “Successive demands are but links of a chain at the end of which stands the overthrow of the status quo.”

While nations continue to appease China believing it would change its ambitions, it continues to build artificial structures and build its military presence in disputed waters, inarguably deliberate attempts to shift the status quo right under the world’s nose.

It is worth contemplating if the appeasing side even has the capability to satiate the opposing party’s demands in the first place. J.L Richardson (1988) opines that “the fundamental reason for the failure of appeasement was that Hitler's goals lay far beyond the limits of reasonable accommodation that the appeasers were prepared to contemplate.”⁴ This was a problem with Hitler, whose demands are essentially too large to fulfill.

China’s claim is not exactly world domination, but the territory and natural resources within its vaunted nine-dash-line comes close. It overlaps many interests, not only the claimants themselves but also major powers with security and economic interests in the region. Moreover, the South China Sea is a major shipping lane where more than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage (roughly USD 5.3 trillion in commodities) passes through.⁵ It is not something easily offered in a box with a bow.

Another problem with appeasement is that it causes belligerent nations to grow more brazen. China is obviously not the Germany of the past. However, China’s creeping

By 13 March 1939, Germany violated the Munich Agreement by invading the rest of Czechoslovakia. On 01 September 1939, Germany attacked Poland. Honoring their promise to come to Poland’s aid in case of Nazi aggression, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 03 September 1939. Chamberlain’s so-called “peace for our time” turned out to be short-lived and eventually led to the most devastating war in human history.

³ Morgenthau, Hans (1967), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed, Knopf (New York).

⁴ Richardson, J.L. (1988), 'New Perspectives on Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations', *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3, Cambridge University Press, pp. 289-316.

⁵ *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Review of Maritime Transport 2011*, as cited in U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘Analysis Brief, The South China Sea,’ February 7, 2013, <<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs>>.

assertion on the SCS and ECS is eerily reminiscent of Germany and Italy in the pre-WWII years. Hitler and Mussolini realized that its neighbors were determined to avoid confrontation, and thus continued to test their limits with initially tentative and then increasingly flagrant violations of international norms. In October 1935, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia with little more than token sanctions from the League of Nations. In March 1936, Hitler blatantly violated the Treaty of Versailles by remilitarizing Rhineland, again without facing the expected reprisal from the British and the French. During the Spanish Civil War, Germany and Italy sent military troops and assets to rebels despite a standing Non-Intervention Agreement.⁶ Impotent responses from the international community showed Nazi Germany that they had a very wide berth when it comes to employing normally unacceptable behavior. Steve Chan (1984) believes that “their concession—made at the expense of their ally Czechoslovakia—appears only to have whetted Hitler’s appetite for additional territory...According to the appeasement theory of war, World War II might have been averted if the democracies had been more resolute in their opposition to Hitler’s earlier aggressions....The moral of the lesson of Munich is that appeasement discredits the defenders’ willingness to fight, and encourages the aggressor to escalate his demands.”⁷

Over the past decades, countries continue to peacefully engage China. ASEAN has embraced China as a Dialogue Partner despite the interlocking claims at the South China Sea. The U.S. is notable in that it engages China in multiple fronts including military cooperation despite differences in opinion in the area of human rights, freedom of expression, and respect for international law. It is worth noting that decades of this approach has not resulted in less aggressive behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea. In fact, it seems to have bolstered China’s assertiveness and encouraged threatening language towards the region. Continuing to appease China is unlikely to change, much less improve this behavior, especially when escalating belligerence is consistently met with mild reproaches from the international community.

Perhaps it is easy for certain nations to opt for appeasement towards China because of distance and detachment. During Chamberlain’s time, Hitler’s designs on Czechoslovakia was a major concern yet remains the problem of ‘the other.’ This distinct uncoupling is reflected in Chamberlain’s words when called the crisis “a quarrel in a faraway country, between people of whom we know nothing.”⁸ No country expects

⁶ McDonough, Frank (2002), *Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement (Cambridge Perspectives in History)*, Cambridge University Press.

⁷ Chan, Steve (1984), *International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare and Justice*, Macmillan (New York), pp. 88-89. Britain and Czechoslovakia were not allies.

⁸ Broadcast (27 September 1938), quoted in "Prime Minister on the Issues", *The Times* (28 September 1938), p. 10.

another state to be its keeper. However, we live in an interconnected world where promoting and maintaining a stable and rules-based environment – one where states abide by certain normative behavior and do not just claim whatever territory they desire – is in *everyone's* interest. The eventual war in Europe despite the Czech matter being simply a quarrel in a “faraway country” is a fine example of why nations should care for another’s troubles. This is even more evident in our time, where geographic stability reaps economic dividends not only for individual countries but entire regions. Even more apropos is this scenario where many of the nations involved are connected via a formal “ASEAN Community” as full members and dialogue partners. Where is the sense of community, and how should such stakeholders behave when the region is on the precipice of regressing into an environment driven by brute might rather than rule of law?

The region and the rest of the world benefit from a peaceful, rules-based environment. Similarly, no one gains from having an empowered and increasingly belligerent power. There are no dividends to be had in allowing a blossoming region to transform into one that allows blatant disregard of internationally accepted norms. Belligerent behavior should not be fostered with appeasement, because this will only encourage even more aggressive behavior. When the region finally does reach its ‘breaking point,’ it may be too late.

Zack Cooper

The United States and Japan must work more closely together to confront shared challenges in the “grey zones” between peace and war. The difficulties are two-fold. First, leaders must generate a consensus that grey zone coercion is a serious problem that requires development of new policies, particularly from the United States. Second, officials in Washington and Tokyo must jointly devise and implement innovative policies tailored to deter such coercion. Progress is being made in both areas, but more urgency is required to prevent a further deterioration of the status quo in East Asia.

Recognizing China’s Grey Zone Challenge

In recent years, Chinese leaders have engaged in a series of coercive actions that appear designed to alter the status quo in East Asia. China has systematically used coercive tactics to advance its maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. Beijing’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea is only the latest in a string of actions that have undermined regional stability and security. Chinese forces have also interdicted vessels and aircraft operating in disputed areas, including international waters and airspace. These actions have forced China’s neighbors, including Japan, to reevaluate their efforts to maintain regional order.

Despite U.S. and Japanese efforts to prevent such incidents by engaging Chinese leaders, coercive actions have continued unabated. In fact, over the last five years Chinese coercive activities appear to have accelerated, potentially due to the perception the Beijing has a “window of opportunity” to alter the regional order. The inability of U.S. and Japanese policymakers to deter China’s coercive actions, or to jointly articulate a coherent counter-coercion strategy, has raised questions about the alliance’s ability to incorporate China into the post-war international order. There is an urgent need, therefore, for the United States and Japan, working together with other allies and partners, to develop a strategy to counter Chinese coercion.

A counter-coercion strategy will necessitate a shift—particularly in the United States—from a crisis management mindset to a more deterrence-focused approach. Crisis management strategies minimize the risk of escalation but can encourage risk-taking behavior by adversaries. Ongoing efforts to negotiate a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea and to adopt the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea have demonstrated the region’s commitment to crisis management efforts. Yet, these efforts do not appear to have decreased grey zone coercion. In fact, with decreased risk of crisis

escalation, China has little reason to cease its pressure campaign. If crisis management continues to be the objective, then the United States and its allies and partners will have to accept continued low-level coercion.

One particular danger of a U.S. crisis management approach is that allies and partners might not be willing to accept continued low-level coercion. U.S. policymakers have been wary of accepting a higher risk of conflict given their efforts to establish a “new model of major power relations” with China. Yet, as China’s neighbors attempt to deter coercion, they have inherently accepted a higher risk of conflict. If the United States does not align its strategy to those of its allies and partners, they could be painted as unnecessarily increasing the risk of U.S. entrapment in a conflict with China. Such a split would allow China to isolate these states and threaten not only the territorial status quo, but also the broader U.S. alliance framework in East Asia.

Devising a Counter-Coercion Strategy

Shifting from a risk management approach to a grey zone deterrence strategy will require that policymakers accept a higher risk of escalation to deter risk-taking behavior. Policymakers are predisposed to avoid risk, but growing concern about Chinese pressure in East Asia has prompted many experts in Washington to admit the need for a reassessment of U.S. policies. An insufficient U.S. response strengthens the narrative that the U.S. position in the region is unsustainable. Countering this narrative will require a persistent strategy grounded in a theory of grey zone deterrence.

Emerging grey zone deterrence theories are rooted in the study of Cold War deterrence concepts. For example, the stability-instability paradox was a Cold War theory that explained why mutually assured nuclear destruction did not prevent, and in some cases even encouraged, risk taking at the conventional military level. Similarly, one might say today that efforts to increase stability at the conventional military level have incentivized China’s use of paramilitary forces, particularly its coast guard. Such deterrence theories suggest a number of steps that U.S. and Japanese policymakers might adopt to deter grey zone coercion. These include:

- *Exposing Coercion*: To address the challenges of determining just what China is doing in the East and South China Seas, the United States, Japan, and others could publicize China’s coercive actions. In particular, images, videos, and data showing China’s attempts to challenge the regional status quo would allow a more direct link between Chinese aggression, public recognition, and international responses.
- *Vertical Escalation*: The United States and other regional states must also

consider blurring the lines between conventional military operations and paramilitary operations. Just as U.S. leaders blurred the line between nuclear and conventional operations in the Cold War, such steps could help to deter Chinese provocations. In the grey zones, this could involve using grey-hulled military ships in addition to white-hulled coast guard vessels. China opposes such actions because it has a competitive advantage at the paramilitary level, but China should not be allowed to both instigate crises and determine the form of the competition.

- *Horizontal Escalation:* Another deterrence option is horizontal escalation designed to put pressure on China in other domains. For example, using incidents of Chinese coercion to more closely weave regional allies and partners together, and to increase U.S. deterrent posture, could alter the Chinese risk calculus. Strengthening U.S. and Japanese ties with India, Australia, and Southeast Asian partners could help to deter Chinese from efforts to alter regional security arrangements.

Conclusion

The risks inherent in these policies are real, particularly as Chinese power grows. Yet, these risks underscore the importance of pushing back now against Chinese coercion, before Beijing is further emboldened. There is little reason to believe that Chinese leaders will change course without a forceful response. Upholding the status quo necessarily increases the risk of conflict and thus represents a tough policy decision. But one thing is clear: the current strategy is failed to deter grey zone coercion; a new strategy is needed.

Nguyen Lan Anh

East Asia is one of the dynamic maritime domains of the world, consisting of the South China Sea, East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. East Asia seas are well known not only for being one of the world richest fishing grounds and the most diversified marine environment, but also for their strategic importance for navigation and maritime security. The interests and strategic locations of the East Asia seas also lead to the existence of many complicated and long lasting territorial and maritime disputes. Among them are the dispute between China and Vietnam over the Paracels, between China, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan over the Spratlys in the South China Sea, between China and Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu, between Japan and South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo. In this context, competition among the countries in the region is on the raise and cooperation is in decline, putting the East Asia seas under pressing environmental challenges.

Threats to Ocean Environment in East Asia Seas

Pressing environmental challenges in the East Asia seas come from two kinds of activities, over exploitation of living resources and land reclamation.

Access to fish stock is one of the hot issues in the 21st century and in the East Asia Seas, it seems even more serious. East Asia seas are surrounded by countries with long traditional fishing habit and preference to fish in their diet. Among them, China, with the world biggest fishing fleet of 70,000 fishing boats, seems to be sailing full-speed ahead with little regards for other nations. For the last few years, China seems to have used fishing grounds as a proxy battlefield for political influence and a means of fortifying its territorial and maritime claims in the disputes with its neighbors. China has illegally claimed the entire South China Sea—1,600 kilometres long and 800 kilometres wide—as its sovereign fishing grounds.¹ China is increasingly sending high capacity fishing vessels in masses, among them some can fish continuously up to nine months, to grasp the fishing resources of other countries. Chinese fishermen have been caught fishing illegally off the coasts of Japan, Argentina, Guinea and many countries in between. China also unilaterally announced fishing ban with broad application scope without scientific evidence. These practices have encouraged irresponsible fishing practices in the East Asia Sea and led to the serious decline of the marine biodiversity.

Gaining control and occupation in the disputed features at sea is also a part of the

¹ Only China can save the seas, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/only-china-can-save-the-seas-commentary1/>

competition between parties in territorial disputes. In the East Asia Sea, as the latecomer, China only occupied small and submerged features. In order to strengthen its occupation and build up outposts for its maritime strategy, China currently conduct massive land reclamation in the South China Sea by dredging the seabed and building up huge artificial structures. These techniques not only caused pollution by introducing “alien” substance to the marine environment,² but also devastated the coral reefs in the South China Sea. As a semi-enclosed sea, the South China Sea enjoyed a rich marine diversity with hundreds of coral species and ideal habitat for fish stocks. Yet, such marine environment is very fragile and sensitive to destructive technical methods, for example dredging or using explosives and poisons.³ The land reclamation activities of China, therefore, will cause tremendous negative impacts and permanent damages to the marine environment.

Rule-Based Approach to Ocean Environment Management

Given the negative impacts from pressing environmental challenges, it is high time to recall the rule based approach to ocean environment management to create responsible practices for environment protection of the East Asia seas. As all the littoral states in East Asia seas are members of UNCLOS, first and foremost, the countries in East Asia must comply with a general obligation set by UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment. Such obligation is provided to be implemented by the duty of coastal states to determine allowable catch and establishing conservation measures based on scientific evidence (Articles 61 and 119), the duty to take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of technologies under their jurisdiction or control, or the intentional or accidental introduction of species, alien or new, to a particular part of the marine environment, which may cause significant and harmful changes (Article 196) and the obligations to conduct prior notice and consultation with relevant parties (Article 198).

Beyond UNCLOS, other legal frameworks namely the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 of 1992, 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Treaties on Conservation of Mammal Species, The 1972 London Dumping Convention and the 1996 Protocol... also required coastal state to identify possible harmful substance to the marine environment, conduct precautionary, ecosystem and sustainable development approaches and conduct environment impact assessment. These

² Art 1(4) of the 1982 United Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has provided that “pollution of the marine environment means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities”.

³ Fao: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/3320/en>

legal frameworks also set out responsibility and liability for the breach of obligations.

As environment protection is not a matter that one state alone can solve, it rather requires the effort and cooperation of all parties concerned. Cooperation in the context of marine environment protection is not only the need, but also an obligation provided in UNCLOS. Accordingly, coastal states have duties to cooperate in conducting research, exchange information and data (Articles 61 (4), 119 (2) & 200), monitoring and asserting the risks to marine environment (Article 204), establishing and enforcing conservation measures (Article 61 (2) & 118). Cooperation also further required in an environment of a semi-enclosed sea like the South China Sea or the Yellow Sea (Article 123).

By conducting unilateral and illegal activities to overexploit the living resources, and by conducting land reclamation, China not only goes contrary to the obligation of a member state, but also fails to cooperate with other countries to protect the marine environment in the East Asia Sea. While waiting for responsible practices from China, in order to address the urgent environmental challenges in the East Asia seas, other countries should move ahead by promoting cooperation in the field of conducting research, exchange information and data, monitoring and assessing the risks to marine environment, establishing and enforcing conservation measures. Countries and parties, either within or outside the region with advanced technology like Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, EU, should also support or take the lead by providing technical assistance for environmental cooperation in the region.

Elina Noor

Maritime security has evolved in recent times to become a euphemistic reference to territorial disputes in East Asian seas. Occasionally, discussions return to the issue of piracy which was du jour about a decade ago but as with analyses on overlapping claims in the East and South China Seas, these too are punctuated by posturing and overlaid with pessimism.

Often overlooked are perspective, context, and pragmatism.

First, on piracy. Figures by the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) show an increase in 2014 to 183 actual or attempted attacks compared to 150 in 2013 and 133 in 2012. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 75 per cent of 245 worldwide piracy attacks took place in Southeast Asia last year, with many having occurred in and around Indonesia. The largest year-on-year increase in attacks happened in Malaysia (24 in 2014 and 9 in 2013) and the adjacent portion of the South China Sea.

What is seldom explained in the same breath is that the definition of piracy as adopted by these bodies encompasses even thefts of personal items such as electronic mobile devices, cash, and scrap metal. These thefts comprised over half of ReCAAP's reports. So, while these reports, themselves filed voluntarily by the aggrieved, may be factually accurate, they do not always reflect the complete picture. Lumping petty thefts with more serious incidents of hijacking complicates understanding of the piracy problem, specifically, and maritime security, more generally and invites suggestions of more aggressive responses that may not necessarily be warranted.

Second, on territorial disputes. The standard appurtenance to discussions on overlapping claims in the South China Sea is adherence to the rule of law, to international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), or some phrasal variation thereof. Observance of the law is crucial, especially in a contest of claims and of will. It prevents a dispute from deteriorating into violence and cynically viewed, affords states a veneer of moral high ground and credibility by falling to the law. It would however, be naïve to consider international law in isolation from the larger political context that frames it and that results in divergent interpretations of it.

While states may be committed to treaties in letter, starker, sometimes conflicting on-the-ground or at-sea developments and varied interpretations of obligations and responsibilities warrant a more pragmatic reading of international law. Concordantly,

expectations on state behaviour should also be adjusted as governments observe, respond, and react to each other's movements.

Where before there were perhaps fewer questions in Malaysia about Chinese intentions, there are now growing concerns about the series of Chinese moves in the South China Sea particularly in the last couple of years. Malaysia is geographically further from China than the Philippines and Vietnam, but China's nine-dash line extends far south all the way to the Malaysian coastline. There have, for example, been reports of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)'s patrols near Beting Serupai or James Shoal within Malaysia's Exclusive Economic Zone in January 2014, repeated visits around south Luconia Shoal, and other moves and countermoves in the wider area of the South China Sea.

As countries strategize their approaches, parallel tracks to manage and resolve the South China Sea dispute have emerged. The Philippines, for example, has embarked on an arbitration case with China even as negotiations on the Code of Conduct (CoC) plod along within the ASEAN framework.

While recognizing that claimant countries have every right to, and will, pursue decisions in furtherance of what they deem to be in their best national interest, it is nonetheless hopeful that the CoC will provide a measure of predictability in the SCS.

There is frustration, no doubt, as well as cynicism and scepticism about the pace of the CoC and what the CoC can achieve without enforcement provisions. However, any effort that aims to provide a guide on expected and accepted behaviour at sea deserves support. It is important to note that the CoC track does not preclude other initiatives – whether, diplomatic, political, or legal – from being pursued since it would only be natural for states to protect and advance their interests ways they deem best.

Third, in moving forward on maritime security, rationalizing the rise and actions of states from their perspective is as important as contextualizing them to avoid speculation and overreaction. An official looking out of a window in Beijing will have different views of regional security developments than one looking out from Washington or Putrajaya. Understanding and acknowledging – though not necessarily agreeing to – each other's viewpoints is vital to advancing controversial conversations on maritime security beyond the blinkers of a government's own opinions. Relatedly, it is imperative for states to not only explain their intentions in order to promote trust, confidence, and good neighbourliness but above all, to act in line with those statements. It is when a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality appear that perceptions get muddled.

There are no doubt disparities in size, power, influence, and capacity among states

in the region. Yet, each has a critical role to play in clarifying intentions, alleviating tensions, and ensuring adherence to the universally recognized principles of international law.

Japan has had a sterling track record in the past 70 years in promoting peace, security, and stability in the region through a number of avenues. For Southeast Asia, in particular, this has been most marked in development assistance, technical and technological exchange, and capacity-building. As Japan normalises and seeks to more proactively play a positive role in the wider East Asia region, it should continue to contribute through capacity-building initiatives – individually and multilaterally – including in maritime domain awareness where it has built a niche for itself. As it looks keenly forward, so too should it look humbly back in order to garner regional cooperation and collaboration as widely as possible without seeking to draw divisions or antagonism that a fast rising East Asia cannot stand to risk.